The American Dream Up for Sale: A Blueprint for Ending International Labor Recruitment Abuse by unknown
The American Dream Up for Sale: 
A Blueprint for Ending 
International Labor Recruitment Abuse
The InTernaTIonal labor recruITmenT WorkIng group
2 A Blueprint for ending internAtionAl lABor recruitment ABuse
Acknowledgments
the international labor recruitment Working group, formed in october 2011, is a coordinated effort to strategically 
address abuses in international labor recruitment across visa categories. the Working group is composed of 
organizations working in various industries and with workers across employment sectors and visa categories. 
this report represents a consolidation of the research and experience of Working group members. the following 
organizations have authored this report: Afl-cio, Aft, centro de los derechos del migrante, inc. (cdm), the coalition 
to Abolish slavery and trafficking (cAst), department for professional employees (dpe), economic policy institute 
(epi), farm labor organizing committee (floc), farmworker Justice, global Workers Justice Alliance, national 
domestic Workers Alliance (ndWA), national employment law project (nelp), national guestworker Alliance (ngA), 
safe Horizon, seiu, solidarity center, southern poverty law center (splc), uniteHere! and Verité. the following 
organizations endorse the content of the report: free the slaves, polaris project and Vital Voices global partnership.
the authors thank the students of the international and comparative law clinic of the university of maryland francis 
King carey school of law who, under the supervision of centro de los derechos del migrante, inc., did substantial 
drafting of the report.
A Blueprint for ending internAtionAl lABor recruitment ABuse 3
Contents
Acknowledgments 2
Executive Summary 5
Overview of Abuses 7
Background and History of U.S. Work Visa Programs 8
Freedom from Discrimination and Retaliation 12
chart of regulatory framework 15
recommendations 16
Right to Know 17
chart of regulatory framework 20
recommendations 22
Freedom from Economic Coercion 23
chart of regulatory framework 26
recommendations 28
Right to Receive a Contract with Fair Terms and to Give Informed Consent 29
chart of regulatory framework 31
recommendations 32
Employer Accountability 34
chart of regulatory framework 36
recommendations 36
Freedom of Movement 37
chart of regulatory framework 38
recommendations 39
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 40
chart of regulatory framework 41
recommendations 42
Access to Justice 43
chart of regulatory framework 44
recommendations 45
Appendices 46
Appendix A: members of the international labor recruitment Working group 
    Who Authored and endorse this report 46
Appendix B: Additional organizations that endorse this report 49
Endnotes 50

A Blueprint for ending internAtionAl lABor recruitment ABuse 5
each year, hundreds of thousands of people from 
around the world are recruited to work in the united 
states on temporary work visas.1 internationally recruited 
workers2 are employed in a wide range of u.s. industries, 
from low-wage jobs in agriculture and landscaping to 
higher-wage jobs in technology, nursing and teaching. 
they enter the united states on a dizzying array of visas, 
such as H-1B, H-2A, H-2B, J-1, A-3, g-5, eB-3, B-1, 
o-1, p-3, l, opt and tn visas, each with its own rules 
and requirements. this report will demonstrate two key 
findings regarding the current u.s. work visa system:
1. regardless of visa category, employment sector, race, 
gender or national origin, internationally recruited 
workers face disturbingly common patterns of 
recruitment abuse, including fraud, discrimination, 
severe economic coercion, retaliation, blacklisting and, 
in some cases, forced labor, indentured servitude, debt 
bondage and human trafficking. 
2. disparate rules and requirements for workers, 
employers and recruiters,3 as well as lax enforcement 
of the regulations that do exist, allow and even 
incentivize recruiters and employers to engage in 
abuses.
the international labor recruitment Working group 
(“the Working group”) seeks to end the systemic abuse 
of international workers who are recruited to work in the 
united states. By convening workers’ rights advocates 
across labor sectors, the Working group has undertaken 
a thorough analysis of the current regulatory and 
enforcement framework to identify the shortcomings 
and gaps in worker protections. this report aims to bring 
the voices of internationally recruited workers of all skill 
and wage levels into policy discussions to illustrate the 
extent of the problems with international labor recruitment 
practices. this report shows how structural flaws in work 
visa programs increase the vulnerability of workers to 
human trafficking. 
the Working group calls upon the u.s. government 
to adopt policies that protect internationally recruited 
workers from recruitment abuse. to do so, the 
government must acknowledge that these abuses are 
systemic rather than visa specific. effective policies and 
oversight must be comprehensive, addressing core issues 
common across the worker recruitment experience. 
Executive Summary
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Comprehensive Recommendations
1. A thorough overhaul of work visa programs that is 
comprehensive in nature and addresses recruitment 
abuse is required.
2. recruiters should be regulated. 
a. An office of international labor recruitment 
should be created to monitor international labor 
recruitment. the office of international labor 
recruitment should create and maintain a publicly 
available online database.
b. employment contracts should be mandated for 
internationally recruited workers.
3. employers should be accountable for the actions of 
recruiters and the agents of recruiters.
a. employers and recruiters should be jointly and 
severally liable for abuses in international labor 
recruitment.
b. employment contracts should list the recruiters and 
agents of recruiters who are working on behalf of 
the employers. All contracts should be maintained 
in a database.
4. payment of recruitment fees by workers should be 
prohibited across all work visa categories.
5. Workers should have access to self-help advocacy and 
legal aid.
a. internationally recruited workers should be provided 
pre- and post-departure information on their rights 
under the law and information on organizations they 
can contact.
b. Workers should have an effective and efficient 
mechanism for raising complaints that ensures 
adequate whistle-blower protections.
6. data should be collected to monitor international labor 
recruitment. 
a. the gAo should be encouraged by congress 
to issue reports that address international labor 
recruitment.
b. data across agencies should be linked and made 
publicly available. 
the Working group has developed a list of eight core 
principles that must be adhered to in any work visa 
program to prevent recruitment abuse. these principles 
should inform a comprehensive overhaul of the laws, 
structure and enforcement of all work visas that are used 
to recruit international workers to the united states. 
1. Freedom from Discrimination and Retaliation. 
Workers shall have the right to a recruitment and 
employment experience free of discrimination and 
retaliation. 
2. Right to Know. Workers shall have the right to be 
informed in a language they understand about the 
recruitment process and their rights under u.s. work 
visa programs. 
 
3. Freedom from Economic Coercion. Workers shall 
have the right to freedom from economic coercion in 
u.s. work visa programs. 
4. Right to Receive a Contract with Fair Terms and 
to Give Informed Consent. Workers shall have the 
right to a legal employment contract that respects their 
rights and the right to provide informed consent before 
being hired. 
5. Employer Accountability. Workers shall have the right 
to be recruited for work in the united states under a 
system that holds the employer accountable for any 
and all abuses suffered during their recruitment or 
employment.
6. Freedom of Movement. Workers shall have the right 
to move freely and change employers while working in 
the united states. 
 
7. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining. 
Workers shall have the right to form and join unions 
and to bargain and advocate collectively to promote 
their rights and interests. 
8. Access to Justice. Workers shall have the right to 
access justice for abuses suffered under u.s. work 
visa programs. 
this report is structured around these core principles, 
highlighting examples of violations of each, and also 
recommending detailed policy solutions.
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internationally recruited workers work in both 
high- and low-wage sectors in the united states. 
they face fraud, discrimination, severe economic 
coercion, retaliation, blacklisting and in some cases 
forced labor, indentured servitude, debt bondage and 
human trafficking. the international labor recruitment 
industry employs abusive tactics to deliver indebted and 
vulnerable workers to u.s. employers. 
After paying recruitment, visa processing and travel costs, 
the majority of internationally recruited workers arrive in 
the united states with considerable debt.4 international 
labor recruiters, who often have a virtual monopoly over 
the job market in which they recruit, charge workers high 
fees for the opportunity to work in the united states. to 
pay these fees, many workers borrow money at high 
interest rates and even use their homes as collateral.5 
recruiters often lie about visa and working conditions 
or require workers to sign extremely disadvantageous 
employment contracts.6 predictably, workers who arrive in 
the united states in debt are much less likely to leave the 
job, whatever the conditions, without first earning enough 
to repay their debt.7 Workers generally are unable to repay 
these loans by working in their home countries for lower 
wages. High debts combined with exploitative conditions 
make workers extremely vulnerable to human trafficking. 
Because of common practices in the international 
labor recruitment industry and the structure of the u.s. 
work visa program, employers are able to exploit an 
essentially captive workforce, and workers are deterred 
from asserting their rights under u.s. law. Workers 
who complain routinely are blacklisted, threatened or 
physically intimidated by recruiters.8 Additionally, many 
internationally recruited workers face language barriers, 
racism, xenophobia, sexism and the pressures of poverty 
in both the united states and their home countries.
the majority of internationally recruited workers are tied 
to a single u.s. employer through their visas. With few 
exceptions, an internationally recruited worker’s legal 
immigration status is dependent on his or her continuing 
relationship with the employer. in most cases, a worker 
who resigns or is fired from employment no longer is 
authorized to remain in the united states; the worker 
is required to return to his or her home country within 
several days and the employer is required to inform the 
department of Homeland security of the termination. 
When they return to their home countries, internationally 
recruited workers who complain are blacklisted by 
recruiters who control access to future employment 
opportunities in the united states. finally, internationally 
recruited workers who, in spite of these risks, report 
unlawful employment practices face incredible obstacles 
to accessing legal services in the united states.
Overview of Abuses
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the united states’ work visa system is designed 
to facilitate legal labor migration to fill labor shortages 
in particular sectors of the economy. the system is 
composed of numerous immigrant and nonimmigrant 
visas9 created at distinct times in history and in response 
to specific economic and political conditions.10 the rules 
and regulations that govern each program vary widely, but 
together the programs share a loose common structure: 
Workers are recruited on behalf of u.s. employers in their 
home countries, apply for visas at u.s. consulates and 
then travel to the united states to perform a specific job 
for a designated period of time for a single employer. in 
the case of nonimmigrant workers, the legal immigration 
status of the worker depends on the continued, specified 
employment for which the visa was granted. At the end of 
the specified period, or at the behest of the employer, the 
worker returns to his or her home country. for immigrant 
workers, continued employment with a designated 
employer is not a condition of legal immigration status, 
but is often a condition of a work contract or contract with 
a recruitment agency. the majority of these programs 
also are designed to ensure the admission of international 
workers will not adversely affect the job opportunities, 
wages and working conditions of u.s. workers.11 
the united states has a long history of using international 
workers to fulfill labor needs. initially, slaves from Africa 
were used to provide manual labor in the united states. 
After the abolition of slavery, chinese workers were 
used by American employers in large numbers, until 
their participation in the workforce was curtailed by the 
chinese exclusion Act in 1882. Japanese immigration then 
surged, until Japanese labor migration was terminated 
by the “gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907 between the 
united states and the empire of Japan.12 Afterward, 
filipino laborers were recruited intensely, especially by the 
Hawaiian sugar planters’ Association, until 1934 when 
congress instituted a quota.13 
in 1946, the large-scale recruitment of contract laborers 
from mexico began, as the united states and mexico 
entered into a bilateral agreement under which more than 
4 million mexicans, known as braceros, came to work in 
the united states.14 during the program’s 22-year history, 
Background and History 
of U.S. Work Visa Programs
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participation rates fluctuated from 100,000 to 450,000 
workers annually. today, in addition to the roughly 56,000 
temporary agricultural workers admitted through the 
H-2A program,15 the united states admits more than a 
half-million international workers each year to perform 
jobs across an increasingly wide range of employment 
sectors. internationally recruited workers are employed as 
landscapers, domestic workers, carnival workers, forestry 
workers, seafood workers, hotel workers, maids/janitors, 
herders, computer programmers, engineers, nurses and 
public school teachers.
Beginning in the 1950s, a number of temporary work visa 
programs were created in response to specific economic 
or political considerations. many early programs are now 
in their second or third incarnation. the H-2 program, 
created for limited use in 1943 to admit caribbean sugar 
cane workers to florida, was revised as part of the 1986 
immigration reform and control Act and split into two 
separate programs: the H-2A agricultural program and 
the H-2B nonagricultural program.16 the immigration 
Act of 1990 created the H-1B program for “specialty 
occupations,” revised from a similar program established 
in 1952. the immigration Act of 1990 also created three 
new visa categories—the H-1c visa for nurses17 in areas 
of critical shortage, and the o and p visas for prominent 
educators, artists, scientists, athletes and entertainers.18
international political considerations drove the creation of 
other work visa programs. the A-3 and g-5 visas were 
created to enable diplomats, representatives of foreign 
governments and employees of certain international 
organizations to bring domestic workers with them when 
they traveled, or temporarily relocated, to the united 
states. the B-1 visa, used for business travel, was 
created to admit domestic workers of foreign nationals or 
u.s. citizens living abroad.19 in 1961, congress created 
the J-1 exchange Visitor program. originally created 
to facilitate educational and cultural exchange with 
other nations, the program now operates far afield of its 
original intent. it is used primarily as a temporary worker 
program and has become attractive to employers due to 
lax enforcement of its minimally protective regulations. 
today the program authorizes approximately 300,000 
internationally recruited workers annually, more than 
any other temporary work visa program in the united 
states.20 the l-1 visa was established by congress in 
1970 in response to unintended consequences of the 
1965 immigration Amendments, which impeded u.s. 
companies operating abroad from bringing staff in foreign 
offices to work in u.s. offices.21 the l-1 visa was intended 
to allow companies to transfer executive- and managerial-
level staff to their u.s. offices, but weak worker 
protections and nearly nonexistent government oversight 
have made this visa category particularly appealing to 
unscrupulous employers seeking to circumvent prevailing 
wage rates and immigration laws.22
the result of this piecemeal construction is that the work 
visa system lacks coherence across visa categories.23 
since each visa was created separately, each visa’s 
regulatory framework differs greatly. overlaps in the work 
visa programs allow employers in certain industries to 
select the visa with the easiest availability or the weakest 
worker protections. for example, an employer can bring in 
a teacher through the J-1 or H-1B programs, a greenhouse 
worker through the H-2A, H-2B or J-1 programs, and a 
domestic worker through the B-1, A-3 or g-5 programs. 
each program’s certification process, wage rates and 
employee protections and benefits differ considerably.
Workers typically are recruited for temporary worker 
programs in the united states through a network of 
private labor recruiters. recruitment for different industries 
varies, but generally is structured as follows: (1) A local 
recruiter makes contact in a worker’s home community 
to present a job opportunity in the united states. 
interested workers pay a lump-sum fee to the recruiter 
to be considered as candidates. the lump sum rarely is 
itemized, but may include a recruiter’s fee and visa and 
travel expenses. most workers must borrow this money 
from family and friends or from private lenders who often 
are associated with the recruiter and who usually charge 
exorbitant interest rates. (2) the local recruiter directs 
workers to a larger recruitment agency, or counterpart 
agency in the united states, to complete the necessary 
paperwork and receive a formal job offer. Workers may be 
charged fees again at this point. (3) Workers travel to the 
nearest u.s. consulate to attend the visa interview and 
obtain the work visa. (4) Workers travel to the job site in 
the united states. 
However, workers may follow a different recruitment 
path depending on the visa and job type. for example, 
participants in the J-1 Visitor exchange program must find 
employment through a sponsor organization designated 
by the state department. domestic workers who enter 
the united states on B-1, A-3 or g-5 visas already may 
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work for their employers in the home country and choose 
to relocate with the employers to the united states. some 
workers may be screened for their qualifications only by 
the recruiter, while others may interview directly with the 
employer, either in person or via the internet.
recruitment networks often employ abusive, coercive 
tactics to exploit workers eager to find employment in the 
united states. Workers rarely are fully informed about the 
visa limitations or the terms of employment in the united 
states. the relationship between actors in recruitment 
networks frequently is unclear, making it difficult to prove 
liability for fraud or abuse. recruiters often lie about the 
pay rate, type of visa and even type of employment. 
Workers may not receive an employment contract of 
any kind before they depart for the united states. if they 
do receive a contract, it may misrepresent the terms of 
employment, be written in a language the worker does not 
understand, or ultimately be disregarded by an employer. 
internationally recruited workers are particularly vulnerable 
to human trafficking. in practice, temporary work programs  
are a legalized structure for exploiting workers and 
increasing their vulnerability to severe labor exploitation, 
including human trafficking, forced labor, debt bondage 
and involuntary servitude. exploitation ranges from debt 
bondage caused by recruitment fees to confiscation of 
passports and other identity documents, recruiter threats 
of physical violence to families back home and physical, 
sexual and psychological abuse of the worker. 
despite these serious problems, the u.s. government 
has few mechanisms in place to protect internationally 
recruited workers during recruitment. the problems that 
plague internationally recruited workers are systemic—
they begin at the recruitment stage in a worker’s home 
country and continue after the worker arrives in the 
united states. Abuses are present in all visa categories 
and cannot be solved visa by visa. As this report 
demonstrates, a comprehensive solution to work visa 
abuses is required.
the table on the next page is a list of visas that will be 
referred to throughout the report:24
Total Visas Issued by Continent in 201125
Asia Africa europe oceania south America north America total
A-3 570 269 61 10 87 90 1,087
g-5 290 150 60 6 256 73 835
B-1 12,836 3,894 5,300 298 7,963 7,469 37,770
H-1B 98,650 2,244 17,771 836 5,234 4,391 129,134
H-1c 5 1 0 0 0 1 7
H-2A26 39 1,026 326 141 887 52,965 55,384
H-2B 1,496 1,279 2,104 319 301 45,327 50,826
J-1 91,940 8,764 170,817 7,009 31,551 14,161 324,294
l-1 40,751 1,326 19,371 1,554 3,994 3,728 70,728
o-1 1,396 135 5,290 560 1,005 442 8,828
p-3 3,656 594 2,139 44 352 608 7,417
tn 0 0 0 0 0 4,918 (mexico)
53 (canada)
4,971
TOTAL 691,281
A Blueprint for ending internAtionAl lABor recruitment ABuse 11
category description industry History
A-3 personal employees, attendants and 
servants of A visa holders (foreign 
diplomats)
domestic work created in 1952
B-1 personal or domestic employees domestic work created in 1952
eB-3 employment-based immigrant visas, often 
used by professionals and skilled workers
A wide range of professional 
industries
created in 1990
g-5 personal employees, attendants and 
servants of g visa holders (foreign 
government representatives or employees 
of certain international organizations)
domestic work created in 1952
H-1B specialty occupations Architecture, engineering, 
mathematics, physical sciences, 
social sciences, biotechnology, 
medicine and health, education, law, 
accounting, business specialties, 
theology and the arts
created in 1990, 
based on a similar 
program initiated in 
1952
H-1c registered nurses in shortage areas nursing created in 1999, 
expired in 2009; 
may be renewed
H-2A seasonal agricultural workers Agriculture created in 1986, 
based on a program 
created in 1943
H-2B seasonal nonagricultural workers landscaping, forestry, seafood, 
meat/poultry, carnivals, construction, 
carpentry, housekeeping and 
restaurant worker
created in 1986 
when the H-2 
program was 
divided into 
H-2A and H-2B 
programs.
J-1 exchange visitor program A wide range of such professional 
industries as higher education, 
research and medicine to such 
low-wage industries as restaurants, 
amusement parks and dairy farms
created in 1961 
as an outgrowth 
of earlier scientific 
exchange programs 
l-1 intracompany transferee executive or 
manager
science, technology, engineering 
and math
established by 
congress in 1970
o-1 individuals of extraordinary ability or 
achievement
sciences, arts, education, business, 
athletics, television and cinema
created in 1990
p-3 Artists or entertainers coming to be part of a 
culturally unique program
entertainment and the arts created in 1990
tn nAftA professionals the profession must appear on the 
list of approved nAftA professions, 
which are divided into the following 
four categories: general; medical/
allied professional; scientist; teacher
created in 1994
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the u.s. government’s anti-discrimination 
laws aim to convert the u.s. workplace into an engine for 
social equality. the laws prohibit discrimination in hiring 
and employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion 
and national origin. Yet, government-sponsored temporary 
worker programs are quietly reclassifying entire sectors 
of the u.s. workforce by race, gender, national origin and 
age. these programs also are weeding out workers who 
speak out against unlawful employment practices, assert 
their rights under the law or organize for better working 
conditions. during the recruitment process, internationally 
recruited workers are subject to various forms of invidious 
discrimination. recruiters and employers limit access 
to the recruitment stream by national origin, gender and 
age. they sort workers into jobs and visa categories 
based on racialized and gendered notions of work. they 
also retaliate against and blacklist workers who complain 
about unfair or unlawful treatment. 
 
u.s. work visa programs enable employers and recruiters 
to circumvent u.s. anti-discrimination law at the point 
of hire. through work visa programs, an employer 
may select an entire workforce composed of a single 
nationality, gender or age group. the ability to choose 
the exact characteristics of a worker (e.g. male, ages 
25–40, mexican; woman, ages 20–30, filipina) is one of 
the factors that make internationally recruited workers 
attractive to employers.27 employers even can shop for 
internationally recruited workers on employment agency 
websites that advertise workers like commodities.28 
these discriminatory practices are pervasive across 
visa categories and employment sectors. for example, 
workers recruited for the H-2A program almost exclusively 
are young men without families, a demographic thought 
to be ideal for farm labor.29 in contrast, the great majority 
of nurses and domestic workers recruited for the H-1c, 
B-1, A-3 or g-5 programs are young women. Advocates 
are investigating widespread gender-based discrimination 
by employers and recruiters who relegate female 
Freedom from Discrimination  
and Retaliation
Workers shall have the right to a recruitment and employment experience 
free of discrimination and retaliation.
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internationally recruited workers to lower-paying jobs.30 
former H-2B worker marcela olvera-morales filed suit 
against a large recruitment agency alleging the company 
discriminated against her and other women on the basis 
of gender by steering them into positions as H-2B workers 
while refusing to assign them to more desirable positions 
as H-2A workers, which typically are assigned to men.31 
Advocates also think the J-1 visa program, which draws 
workers primarily from eastern european countries, is 
used by employers who seek young white workers for 
“front shop” jobs such as store clerks and wait staff at 
seasonal vacation destinations. meanwhile, the H-2B 
program, which draws workers primarily from mexico 
and central America, is used to fill the “back shop” 
housekeeping and kitchen jobs in those same resort 
areas.
From Mexican-Workers.com, “Nursery workers” (website now inactive; last accessed May 2012)
“We have always looked for the careful and thoughtful person to fill these jobs. calm and tranquil. We have 
found that many work visa candidates live in remote rural areas in mexico where their lives depend on careful 
use of the land, the animals and the resources at their disposal.
What is remarkable to us is the large number of mexican workers who have a delicate touch with their 
hands. the same person can dig a ditch with a shovel and embroider or knit later in the same day.” 
From Mexican-Workers.com, “Ag-Employers FAQ” (website now inactive; last accessed May 2012)
“We look for workers in interior mexico for their work ethics and capacity for hard work.” [emphasis is original]
Source: www.arrowheadmanpower.com/about.html (website suspended; last accessed May 2012)
We are a philippine based corporation specializing in the placement and immigration of highly qualified skilled 
and professional workers seeking employment overseas, in the fields of:
•	 Nursing
•	 Teaching
•	 Physical	Therapy 
Our Unique Asset: The Filipino Worker
the filipino culture has endowed its people with attributes that make them one of the most sought after health 
care givers and teachers in the world. in addition to being highly skilled, literate and competent, filipinos add 
a new dimension to the global workforce with their inherent warmth, caring nature and adaptability to different 
cultures and environments.
From: www.WOLLT.org “More smiling faces in theme parks with foreign j1 students!” 
http://wollt.org/hirej1students/505/theme-parks/
Perfect entry-level positions to cover with foreign students
Below is the list of entry-level positions in theme parks that most often are covered by international students. 
further, we provide a short list of j1 employer benefits. positions include, but are not limited to:
•	 Ride	operators/attendants
•	 Food/beverage	servers
•	 Admission	staff
•	 Merchandise	staff
•	 Pass	processors
•	 Parking	lot	attendants
•	 Golf	course	maintenance
•	 Players’	assistants
•	 Lifeguards
•	 Security
•	 Guest	relations
•	 Maintenance
•	 Entertainment	crew
•	 Wardrobe
•	 Refreshment	car	hosts
•	 Cashiers
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in another example, former H-2B employees filed a 
complaint with the equal employment opportunity 
commission asserting that luxury hotel chain decatur 
Hotels discriminated against them on the basis of national 
origin. decatur Hotel’s applications to the department of 
labor (dol) reveal it sought to pay workers differently 
based on country of origin alone. Bolivians were to be 
paid $6.02 per hour, dominicans $6.09 per hour, and 
peruvians $7.79.32 
Age discrimination against older workers often is explicit 
in H-2A recruitment.33 there are also indications that 
recruiters for H-2B jobs weed out older workers who wish 
to obtain jobs or be rehired.34 
Discriminatory retaliation extends beyond termination 
and blacklisting. Internationally recruited workers 
who assert their rights under the law face physical 
and financial threats to themselves and their families 
by recruiters and employers. After the Southern 
Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit on behalf of 
Guatemalan internationally recruited workers, a labor 
recruiter threatened to burn down a plaintiff’s village 
in Guatemala. 
employers and recruiters also retaliate against workers 
who assert their rights under the law. retaliation and 
blacklisting are prevalent in work visa programs in the 
united states. Because employers control a worker’s 
immigration status, they have the power to end a worker’s 
legal immigration status at their discretion by terminating 
the employment relationship.35 employers wield the threat 
of deportation explicitly.36 for example, an H-2B forestry 
worker reported that his supervisor would rip up the visas 
of workers who complained about inadequate pay and 
would threaten to call immigration to have workers sent 
home.37 Job-dependent immigration status, coupled with 
heavy recruitment debt, is a powerful deterrent to worker 
complaints.38 
 
once fired and forced to leave the country, a worker 
has no way of returning to the united states through a 
temporary visa program without a willing employer. in 
nearly every visa program, the employer, not the worker, 
petitions the government for the work visa. if an employer 
does not want an “uncooperative” worker to return the 
following season, the employer may simply refuse to offer 
that worker a visa in the next season.39 employers and 
recruiters also maintain blacklists of workers who have 
complained in the past. Blacklisted workers are prevented 
from obtaining any employment in the united states.40 the 
stakes are extremely high—a worker who complains risks 
blacklisting his family, friends or even the entire sending 
community.
Blacklisting is an extremely effective deterrent. Workers 
are aware of the industry practice and the risk they may 
potentially jeopardize their own economic opportunities 
as well as their neighbors’. fear is justifiably widespread. 
the highly publicized north carolina growers Association 
blacklist, called the “ncgA ineligible for rehire list,” 
contained more than 1,000 names in 1997 for a single 
industry in a single state.41 livestock herders in colorado, 
recruited on H-2A visas, reported they avoided conflicts 
with employers that could result in retaliation, blacklisting 
or deportation.42 the u.s. government acknowledges that 
blacklisting effectively deters worker complaints. the u.s. 
government Accountability office found H-2A workers 
were “unlikely to complain about worker protection 
violations…because they fear that they will lose their jobs 
or will not be accepted by the employer or association for 
future employment.”43 
discriminatory retaliation extends beyond termination 
and blacklisting. internationally recruited workers who 
assert their rights under the law face physical and financial 
threats to themselves and their families by recruiters and 
employers. After the southern poverty law center filed a 
lawsuit on behalf of guatemalan internationally recruited 
workers, a labor recruiter threatened to burn down a 
plaintiff’s village in guatemala.44 other plaintiffs reported 
death threats against themselves and their families.45 
the court found the plaintiffs had produced evidence to 
establish that the company and its agents had launched 
a “campaign designed to threaten, intimidate and coerce 
plaintiffs, opt-in plaintiffs and potential class members” 
to withdraw the pending claims.46 in interviews with 
domestic workers, Human rights Watch found a major 
reason the workers opted not to file complaints against 
abusive employers was fear that their politically powerful 
employers would harm them and their families in their 
home countries.47 
the current regulatory frameworks of almost all temporary 
employment visas fail to address discriminatory hiring 
practices by recruiters and employers. u.s. employers 
rarely supervise how the recruiters they hire operate in 
foreign countries or whether they comply with u.s. anti-
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discrimination laws.48 employers who violate u.s. anti-
discrimination laws by requesting workers based on age 
and gender preferences seldom are held accountable.49 
one federal court found an H-2A employer’s blatant age 
discrimination at the time of hiring was not actionable 
under the Age discrimination in employment Act because 
the choice to discriminate had occurred outside of the 
united states.50 lack of oversight and accountability 
essentially allows employers to use the temporary work 
visa programs to circumvent u.s. hiring standards.51
the government has few mechanisms in place to 
protect internationally recruited workers from retaliation 
and blacklisting abroad. in fact, the single-employer 
structure of most temporary work visas actually facilitates 
immigration retaliation by u.s. employers. Although the 
rules governing several temporary work visas require 
employers to use licensed recruiters and to register 
any agreements between themselves and a recruiter, 
and prohibit recruiters from charging placement fees 
to workers, these rules do little to protect workers from 
recruitment abuses in their home countries. the u.s. 
government conducts little meaningful monitoring of these 
recruitment agencies or their activities, and chains of 
subcontractors allow employers to escape liability for the 
recruiters’ actions.
Chart of Regulatory Framework
measures to prevent 
discrimination Against 
international Workers
measures to prevent retaliation and Blacklisting
A-3 none may remain in the united states to seek legal redress against former 
employers and may also receive work authorization while seeking redress.52
g-5 none may remain in the united states to seek legal redress against former 
employers and may also receive work authorization while seeking redress.53
B-1 none none
eB-3 none none
H-1B no protection against 
discrimination in foreign 
recruitment. H-1B visa holders 
are explicitly entitled to the 
same benefits as similarly 
employed u.s. workers.54
regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against workers who 
take action to protect their legal rights. if a company retaliates against 
a complaining worker, the employer may be fined up to $5,000 and 
disqualified from filing H-1B petitions for two years.55
H-1c none regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against workers who take 
action to protect their legal rights.56
H-2A none regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against workers who take 
action to protect their legal rights.57
H-2B none none. new regulations would prohibit employers from retaliating against 
workers who take action to protect their legal rights.58 these regulations are 
currently enjoined.59
J-1 none none
l-1 none none
o-1 none none
p-3 none none
tn none none
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to a recruitment and 
employment experience free of discrimination. to this end, 
workers shall have the right to:
1. be recruited in a manner that does not subject them to 
discrimination;
2. be employed in a manner free from discrimination;
3. raise concerns or file complaints about abusive or 
illegal recruitment practices or working conditions 
without fear of discrimination or blacklisting; and
4. organize to advance their interests and protect their 
rights without fear of discrimination or blacklisting.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs60 shall not 
engage in discrimination in the recruitment or employment 
of foreign workers. to this end, employers and labor 
contractors shall not:
1. distinguish, exclude or prefer workers on the basis 
of race, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, pregnancy, familial status, religion, 
disability, political opinion, social class or any other 
basis prohibited by federal or applicable state law, 
that impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation,61 absent a showing that 
such practice is necessary based on the inherent 
requirements of the job;62
2.  punish or blacklist workers for union membership, 
participation in union activities or for acting as a worker 
representative;63 and
3. punish or blacklist workers for raising concerns or 
filing complaints about abusive or illegal recruitment 
practices or working conditions.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall prevent employers and 
labor contractors from engaging in discriminatory practices 
and blacklisting in the recruitment or employment of 
foreign workers. to this end, the u.s. government shall:
1. establish programs and processes to monitor the 
practices of all employers and labor contractors using 
u.s. work visa programs; and
2. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other 
sanctions against noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors, including barring noncompliant employers 
and labor contractors from u.s. work visa programs.
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internationally recruited workers lack adequate 
information about the recruitment process and their 
legal rights as workers in the united states. Without 
this information, workers are ill equipped to protect 
themselves from fraudulent recruitment practices and 
unlawful employment conditions. in this environment, 
recruiters and employers mistreat workers with impunity. 
to prevent abusive recruitment practices, internationally 
recruited workers need access to information about the 
recruiters, labor contractors and employers in the chain 
of their employment. currently, the government does 
not provide sufficient access to meaningful information 
about these actors. for several visas, the dol and state 
department maintain databases that contain information 
about these actors and their past participation in the 
program. However, information about employers who 
engage in unlawful practices is only publicly available 
for the H-1B program.64 in other programs, the dol 
even continues to issue labor certifications to employers 
found by federal courts to have engaged in unlawful 
employment practices.65
 
the system’s lack of transparency makes informed 
decision making difficult for a worker who already is 
unfamiliar with the u.s. legal system and employment 
practices. the majority of workers depend on word of 
mouth to learn if a recruiter, job contractor or employer has 
a history of unscrupulous or unlawful behavior. information 
by word of mouth is limited in the isolated communities 
from which many workers hail. Without information 
regarding the recruitment chain and the compliance 
records of all actors involved, workers rely on a series of 
individuals and agencies that may or may not lead them to 
bona fide employment with a law-abiding u.s. employer. 
 
recruitment fraud is widespread and affects workers 
across visa categories. recruiters routinely charge 
workers for the “privilege” to be considered for jobs and 
visas that do not exist.66 if the job does exist, recruiters 
often fail to provide workers with sufficient information 
about the type of work to be performed, the conditions 
of employment, the location or the name of the actual 
employer.67 in a report on fraud in the H-2B program, the 
u.s. government Accountability office found that H-2B 
Right to Know
Workers shall have the right to be informed in a language they understand 
about the recruitment process and their rights under U.S. work visa programs.
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recruiters and employers misclassified employee duties 
on applications to the dol, used shell companies to file 
fraudulent applications for unneeded employees and then 
leased those employees to businesses not on the visa 
petitions.69
the relationship between actors in a recruitment chain is 
rarely clear. Without access to this information, workers 
encounter difficulty in holding actors accountable for 
fraud, poor working conditions and other abuses. 
employers often are shielded from liability by a string of 
subcontractors; employers may not have direct contact 
with internationally recruited workers and can claim to 
be unaware of the unlawful employment conditions. 
for example, recruitment in the H-2A and H-2B 
programs typically involves a local recruiter, recruitment 
agency, u.s.-based labor broker and the employer. 
local recruiters may be employed by the recruitment 
agency or may act as independent agents. u.s.-based 
labor brokers or job contractors often assume a direct 
supervisory role over the workers and may appear to be 
employers. Workers may not know who actually employs 
them.70 Although the J-1 program allows only state 
department-designated sponsor organizations to solicit 
visas and job placements for participants, sponsors are 
free to subcontract worker recruitment and employment 
placement to other companies. 
the recent J-1 student sit-in and protests at the Hershey 
packing plant in palmyra, pa., in 2011 are illustrative. 
preliminary investigations reveal a complex web of 
actors responsible for subjecting the students to fraud 
and coercion in recruitment and contracting, unlawful 
pay, long hours under terrible working conditions, poor 
living conditions and interference with the students’ 
right to organize, as well as threats and other forms of 
intimidation of students seeking to exercise their rights 
under u.s. law.71 several foreign-based recruitment 
companies funneled students to one international sponsor 
organization, which, through a separate job contractor, 
placed students with a company contracted by Hershey 
to operate one of its packing plants.72 individual students 
who voiced concerns to these various actors about their 
living and working conditions did so in vain. students only 
were able to change their situation after engaging in a 
highly publicized sit-in at the packing plant and protest in 
Hershey, pa.73 it remains to be seen which actors will bear 
legal responsibility for the abuses. 
  
Worker profile: h-2b Fair and Carnival Worker
Juan José rosales, a member of cdm’s migrant defense committee, was 
recruited from mexico to work in the fair and carnival industry on an H-2B 
visa. Juan José reported that the pre-departure information he was provided 
included false representations of work conditions in the united states. When 
Juan José learned about the employment opportunity, the recruiter told him he 
would receive around $7–8 per hour for his work with a fair company. Juan José 
accepted the offer and agreed to travel from his home in mexico to the united 
states for work. He paid approximately $500 in recruitment, visa and passport processing, as well as 
lodging and transportation fees. Juan José was never reimbursed for any of these expenses. 
once he was in the united states, Juan José traveled with fairs to job sites in Alabama, georgia, 
mississippi and tennessee. He was subjected to grueling workweeks, often working in excess of 72 
hours per week. on days the fair was in transit, he worked additional hours taking down, cleaning up 
and packing the rides in one location and then transporting them to the next location where he would 
unpack and set the rides up for the next business day. His wages never amounted to the rate he was 
promised in mexico. on average, he earned only $270 per week, or approximately $3.75 per hour, far 
less than the wage he was promised in mexico, before he came to the united states. in addition, he 
was forced to live in overcrowded trailers with no air conditioning, unclean bathroom facilities and no 
kitchen facilities.68 
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Although the government does little to provide internationally 
recruited workers with information about recruitment, it has 
taken limited measures to provide workers with information 
about their rights in the u.s. workplace. the trafficking 
Victims protection reauthorization Act of 2008 requires 
the u.s. government to create an information pamphlet 
for applicants to employment- and education-based visa 
programs in the united states.74 the pamphlet contains 
information about workers’ rights in the united states 
generally, as well as specific information about rights under 
the majority of temporary work visa programs. during visa 
interviews with applicants for most employment-related 
nonimmigrant visas, u.s. consular officials must confirm 
the applicant has received, read and understood the 
pamphlet.75 the pamphlet directs workers who think 
their rights have been violated to contact one of two hot 
lines that assist victims of human trafficking.76 Between 
2008 and 2010, calls to the national Human trafficking 
resources center, the nongovernmental hot line listed on 
the pamphlet, more than doubled. during this time, the 
percentage of crisis calls remained steady (2% of calls); 
however, calls related in issue but beyond the scope of 
the hot line, such as sexual assault or labor exploitation, 
increased substantially, from 27% to 40% of all calls.77 
this data suggests a dramatic need for information that is 
not limited to trafficking alone.
Worker profile: J-1 Intern and Trainee
sully fernanda Alquinga defaz came to the united states from ecuador in 2011 
on a J-1 visa to work in the hospitality industry. she had recently graduated from 
college and was seeking a professional experience in the united states that 
would further her chosen career in hospitality management. she discovered the 
J-1 intern and trainee program through a brochure on her college campus. A 
local recruiter linked her to a state department-designated sponsor for the J-1 
program. the sponsor’s materials boasted that participants in the J-1 program 
would receive “the knowledge, practical training, leadership and multicultural skills” necessary to 
succeed as a hospitality industry leader. eager to jumpstart her professional career, sully invested 
nearly $4,500 to participate in the J-1 intern and trainee program, including paying $1,500 in fees to 
the ecuadorian recruiter and the J-1 sponsor collectively. Before leaving for the united states, sully 
received a signed, detailed training plan from her sponsor that guaranteed her advanced training in 
management, leadership, supervision, scheduling and customer service.
upon her arrival in the united states, the J-1 sponsor placed sully in the food and Beverage department 
at a hotel in myrtle Beach, s.c. instead of encountering the professional and cultural experience the 
sponsor had promised, however, sully spent the duration of her program performing unskilled labor for 
substandard wages. Her primary tasks were wiping down tables, mopping, polishing silverware and 
sweeping. she never received any of the advanced training she was promised. she was paid with a 
$200 stipend every two weeks for performing at least 40 hours of work per week—a wage well below 
the federal minimum wage. “When i arrived to the united states and started working, i felt tricked. i 
would have never invested so much money in the program had i known it was not going to be a training 
experience. But i had spent so much money to participate that i couldn’t just turn around and leave.”
sully and some of her co-workers filed complaints with the state department and the u.s. 
department of labor against the J-1 sponsor and the hotel. the department of labor collected 
back wages on sully’s behalf for the minimum wage violations. “i’m happy i recuperated some of 
the money i lost, but i worry that my sponsor and other J-1 sponsors are continuing to recruit young 
people with false promises.”
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are you Coming to the United states Temporarily to Work or study?
We are Confident That you Will have an Interesting and Rewarding stay. however, If you 
should encounter any problems, you have Rights and you Can get help!
you have the Right to:
•	 Be	treated	and	paid	fairly;
•	 Not	be	held	in	a	job	against	your	will;
•	 Keep	your	passport	and	other	identification	documents	in	your	possession;
•	 Report	abuse	without	retaliation;
•	 Request	help	from	unions,	immigrant	and	labor	rights	groups	and	other	groups;	and
•	 Seek	justice	in	U.S.	courts.	
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa Access to information regarding rights Access to information regarding recruitment Actors
A-3/g-5 consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.78
no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved with the A-3 or g-5 
visa.79 However, requests for A-3 and g-5 domestic 
workers are noted in the employers’ files in the tomis 
database.
B-1 consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.80
no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved in the B-1 visa.81
eB-3 none no public database exists.
H-1B consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.82
Beginning July 1, 2013, redacted copies of H-1B labor 
certifications will be available through the icert visa 
portal system.83
data on foreign labor certification is available for past 
fiscal years. this includes information about employers, 
their visa petitions and their agents or attorneys.84
the Wage and Hour division also publishes a list of 
willful violators and debarred employers.85
information regarding foreign labor recruiters is not 
publicly available.
H-1c consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.86 
[pamphlet required in 2008; state department 
issued notice to require it be given to all “H” visa 
applicants in 2009—after the H-1c visa expired.*] 
* the H-1c visa expired in december 2009. 
no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved in the H-1c visa.
source: u.s. department of state
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Chart of Regulatory Framework (continued)
Visa Access to information regarding rights Access to information regarding recruitment Actors
H-2A consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.87
Beginning July 1, 2013, redacted copies of H-2A labor 
certifications will be available through the icert visa 
portal system.88
H-2B consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.89
Beginning July 1, 2013, redacted copies of H-2B labor 
certifications will be available through the icert visa 
portal system.90
pursuant to new regulations currently enjoined, the 
employer must provide a copy of all agreements with 
any agent or recruiter in the international recruitment 
of H-2B workers, and the identity and location of 
the persons or entities. these agreements must be 
filed with the Application for Temporary Employment 
Certification.91
J-1 consular officials must confirm the visa 
applicant has received, read and understood the 
educational pamphlet created for employment-
based nonimmigrant visa applicants.92
Additionally, sponsors must provide visa 
recipients with pre-arrival information, including 
the purpose of the program, the home-country 
presence requirement, housing, fees payable 
to the sponsor, health care and insurance, and 
other costs the exchange visitor is likely to 
incur.93 
sponsors must provide orientation as to life 
and customs in the united states, community 
resources, health care or emergency assistance, 
a description of the program, rules that the 
exchange visitors are required to follow, contact 
information for the responsible officer, and 
contact information for the exchange Visitor 
program services of the state department 
and a copy of the exchange Visitor program 
brochure outlining the regulations relevant to the 
exchange visitors.94 
no public database exists with data regarding 
employers or any other actor in the J-1 program. 
sponsors must maintain legal status and 
accreditation.95 
depending on the type of J-1 visa, limitations may 
apply to a sponsor’s ability to contract with a staffing/
employment agency. for example, sponsors are not 
permitted to engage or otherwise cooperate or contract 
with a staffing/employment agency to recruit, screen, 
orient, place, evaluate or train trainees or interns, or in 
any other way involve such agencies in an exchange 
Visitor program training and internship program or 
student internship program.96 
sponsors must keep up-to-date information about all 
of their program participants (exchange visitors, not 
employers) in seVis, but only authorized individuals 
may log in to the database.97 
the state department provides prospective applicants 
with lists of designated sponsor organizations in each 
program category.98 to become a sponsor, entities 
must apply through the state department. sponsors 
may be for-profit entities that charge for their services.99 
l-1 none no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved with the l-1 visa.
o-1 none no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved with the o-1 visa. 
p-3 none no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved with the p-3 visa. 
tn none no public database exists with data about employers 
or any other actor involved with the tn visa. 
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to be informed in a 
language they understand about the recruitment process 
and their rights under u.s. work visa programs. to this 
end, workers shall have the right to:
1. be informed about their rights;
2. access information about labor contractors and 
employers, including information about their 
recruitment supply chains and compliance records;
3. receive education and materials about their rights 
under u.s. work visa programs; and
4. receive information about the legal and social services 
available to them while working in the united states.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall 
provide information to prospective workers at the time 
of recruitment and to the public to achieve greater 
transparency in and awareness about recruitment and 
employment under u.s. work visa programs. to this end, 
employers and labor contractors shall:
1. publicly disclose their recruitment supply chain, 
including all contracted and subcontracted actors, at 
the time the worker is recruited; and
2. ensure workers receive all relevant information about 
the labor, employment and human rights guaranteed 
to them in the united states prior to applying for a visa 
and departure from their home country. 
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall facilitate public 
knowledge about international labor recruitment and 
ensure workers are informed of their rights. to this end, 
the u.s. government shall:
1. publicly disclose employers, foreign and domestic 
labor contractors and information regarding their 
compliance records and practices;
2. establish regulations and educational programs to 
inform internationally recruited workers about their 
legal rights and obligations under u.s. work visa 
programs;
3. establish programs designed to give effective 
assistance to foreign workers in the exercise of their 
rights and for their protection;100
4. cooperate with sending country governments to 
thwart misleading propaganda about u.s. work visa 
programs;101 and
5. provide, at the time of the consular interview, a 
brochure outlining their rights.
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labor recruiters operating in workers’ home countries 
often lead workers to incur significant debt. these 
recruiters charge exorbitant fees, frequently in lump sums, 
to place workers with employers, assist with immigration 
paperwork, arrange travel to and from the united states 
and in some cases arrange housing. to pay these fees, 
many workers obtain high-interest loans that are nearly 
impossible to repay by working in their home countries. 
Workers often are asked to provide collateral for loans, 
putting their homes and the finances of their extended 
families on the line in order to secure employment. in 
addition to pre-employment expenses, internationally 
recruited workers working in professional occupations, 
such as nursing, often pay a significant percentage of 
their yearly salaries to recruitment companies and face 
high fees if they breach their employment contracts. the 
various expenses create a strong incentive to remain on 
the job at all cost. Workers remain in unfair, unsafe and 
even forced labor conditions because the alternative—
returning to their home countries where they cannot 
earn enough to repay pre-employment debt or breach 
fees—is not a viable option. As a result, workers across 
visa categories stay with their employers in debt bondage. 
Although a worker’s payment of recruitment fees may be 
illegal under some u.s. visa categories, and although the 
practice is prohibited under international conventions, 
enforcement is lacking, and the practice continues to 
thrive in the united states. 
the percentage of workers who pay recruitment and travel 
fees to obtain employment in the united states varies 
considerably by industry.102 the amount paid also varies 
substantially, ranging from $100 to $20,000, depending on 
the country of origin and type of employment in the united 
states.103 for example, migrant workers from mexico 
in the maryland crab industry pay recruiters roughly 
$750 per season for all fees and expenses necessary 
to participate in the program, without an explanation of 
what these costs cover.104 guatemalan H-2B workers 
pay an average of $2,000 in travel, visa and recruitment 
fees to obtain employment in the forestry industry in the 
united states.105 teachers recruited for employment in 
H-1B or J-1 visa programs pay fees ranging from $3,000 
to $13,000 to recruiters who schedule interviews, secure 
Freedom from Economic Coercion
Workers shall have the right to freedom from economic coercion 
in U.S. work visa programs.
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visas and arrange transportation and housing.107 the J-1 
students who participated in the highly publicized strike 
at the Hershey processing plant in Hershey, pa., paid 
between $2,000 and $6,000 in pre-employment expenses, 
depending on their country of origin and recruitment 
agency.108 fees can be the first aspect of coercion that 
enslaves people in human trafficking situations. in one 
highly publicized human trafficking case, prosecutors 
alleged that the recruitment company global Horizons 
manpower inc. charged more than 400 thai H-2A workers 
up to $21,000 each to work on farms in Hawaii and 
Washington and held them in forced labor conditions.109 
in addition to thwarting complaints that could lead to 
a retaliatory firing, pre-employment fees discourage 
workers from simply terminating employment in situations 
of unsafe or illegal working conditions. to pay the fees, 
workers borrow from friends and family or obtain high-
interest private loans, sometimes through the same 
person who recruited them.110 in some cases, recruiters 
require worker to leave the deeds to their homes or 
cars as collateral.111 mexican and guatemalan H-2B 
workers in the forestry industry reported 20% monthly 
interest rates on pre-employment debt,112 and mexican 
H-2B workers in the crab industry in maryland reported 
rates of 10 to 15%.113 many participants in the J-1 visa 
program incur pre-employment debt before they secure 
employment in the united states. the J-1 program 
allows a subset of participants to enter the country to 
search for job opportunities.114 participants who have 
incurred debt to procure a visa, pay a program host and 
travel to the united states have enormous incentives to 
accept employment on any terms in order to repay their 
expenses. 
Worker profile: h-1b Teacher
ingrid cruz is one of more than 300 teachers recruited by a filipino recruiting firm, 
pArs international placement Agency, and its sister company, los Angeles-based 
universal placement international, to teach in public schools in louisiana. the 
teachers paid more than $16,000 each (approximately four times what they would 
earn in the philippines annually) to obtain jobs in the united states.
things quickly deteriorated for the teachers once they landed at los Angeles 
international Airport. After a wearying journey to the united states, the teachers were presented with 
a second recruitment contract that required 10 percent of both their first and second year salaries in 
fees, despite the fact they only had been granted one-year visas and they already had paid pArs 20 
percent of their first year’s salary in cash before leaving the philippines.
 
“on the first day we stepped foot in this country, i can still remember how hurtful it was to sign a one-
sided contract under duress stipulating another round of placement fees, fees to be paid to the agency 
if we were fired, prohibitions of having other people review our contract, and other provisions favorable 
only to the agency,” cruz said. “Anyone who tried to question the contract was threatened to be sent 
immediately back home. We were left with no choice but to sign.” 
once in louisiana, where their jobs were based, they learned the recruiter had signed leases on their 
behalf, without their consent, for shared apartments at a run-down apartment complex. the recruiter 
overcharged them rent, obtaining a hefty cut for herself. teachers had to devote much of their salary 
to debt and rent payments—in some instances the loan payments ate up nearly all of the monthly 
paycheck. the recruiter also controlled the renewal of their visas and exacted heavy fees for those 
processing services.106
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recruiters also subject workers to coercive economic 
penalties to ensure they remain on the job. in extreme 
cases, workers’ pay is withheld until they return to their 
home countries.119 for workers in professional occupations, 
recruiters routinely structure breach fees into employment 
contracts. recruiters also may act as intermediaries 
between the worker and employer for the duration of the 
employment contract in order to monitor the employee’s 
work. for example, recruitment agencies contracting with 
nurses typically require a two- to three-year commitment. 
most recruiter contracts include a “buy-out” or breach fee 
the worker must pay if she resigns prior to the end of the 
contract. these fees range from $10,000 to $50,000.120 
the recruitment company teacher placement group 
recruited teachers from india to work in u.s. school 
districts and required its recruits to pay the company 
$15,000 if they returned to india during the first year of the 
contract, $10,000 if they returned during the second year 
and $7,500 if they returned during the third year.121
the u.s. government does not have policies to prevent 
the economic coercion that keeps international workers 
in abusive working conditions in the united states. 
Although several visa programs prohibit the use of 
unlicensed recruitment agencies, require disclosure of 
employer-recruiter contracts and prohibit employers from 
knowingly using recruiters who charge fees to workers, 
these regulations are rarely enforced. recruitment 
agencies often operate outside of the united states and 
therefore are able to hide their activities from government 
monitoring. the visa programs that hold employers 
responsible for reimbursing workers’ recruitment, visa 
processing or travel costs similarly are inadequate 
since the u.s. government has not implemented any 
mechanisms to monitor whether an employer has paid 
for or reimbursed these expenses.122 rather than monitor 
or investigate employers, the department of labor relies 
almost exclusively on worker-driven private legal action as 
a means of enforcement. internationally recruited workers 
face enormous difficulty accessing legal assistance and 
bringing private lawsuits in the united states to recuperate 
these costs.123 the current enforcement structure, 
where the cost of noncompliance is low, leaves workers 
vulnerable to employer abuses and exploitation.
A Risk-Free Program
No Cost. Absolutely none…at any time! our teacher candidates pay all costs and expenses involved that are 
allowed by federal regulations. 
No Obligations. You are not required to hire any minimum amount of teachers through our service. 
No Problems. our teachers have an almost 100% retention rate after their first year at us schools! 
teacher’s council, “international staffing,” www.teacherscouncil.org/intlstaffing/internationalstaffing.html 
Sample of Recruiter Fees Across Visas, Countries of Origin and Industry 
 $750 H-2B, mexico, maryland crab industry115 
$2,000 H-2A, chile, sheep and cattle herding116 
$5,000 + portion of salary for three years H-1B, india and the philippines, public school teachers117 
$20,000 H-2B, india, specialized construction work, 
 mississippi post-Hurricane Katrina118
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Chart of Regulatory Framework 
Visa recruitment and  
Breach fees
Visa cost travel expenses Housing enforcement
A-3 not regulated no costs are 
assessed for visa 
processing.124
employer cannot deduct 
travel expenses from 
wages.125  
employer 
may not 
charge for 
housing, 
cannot 
deduct for 
meals.126
suspension of employers or organizations 
with a history of noncompliance w/ u.s. 
law or terms of the program. 127
B-1 not regulated not specified Varies; in some instances 
employer provides airfare 
to and from the united 
states.128
Varies; in 
some cases 
benefits 
are what 
normally 
would be 
required 
for u.s. 
workers.129 
in other 
cases, free 
room and 
board is 
provided.130
employees whose rights have been 
violated are directed to contact the 
national trafficking resource center hot 
line.131
eB-3 not regulated not regulated not regulated not 
regulated
not regulated
g-5 not regulated no costs are 
assessed for visa 
processing.132
employer cannot deduct 
travel expenses from 
wages.133
employer 
may not 
charge for 
housing, 
cannot 
deduct for 
meals.134
suspension of employers or organizations 
that have a history of non-compliance w/ 
u.s. law or terms of the program.135
H-1B not regulated employer must 
pay petition and 
fraud fees.136
employer must pay 
worker’s return travel 
costs if terminated 
prematurely.137
not 
regulated
employers who violate attestations can be 
denied future visas.138
H-1c not regulated not regulated not regulated not 
regulated
A hospital that is non-compliant with 
the terms of the H-1c visa program can 
be fined or disbarred from the program. 
compliance is not related to worker 
protection from economic coercion 
because that area is not regulated by the 
terms of the program.139  
H-2A employer and its agents cannot 
seek or receive payment of any 
kind for any activity related to 
obtaining H-2A labor certification, 
including recruitment costs 
(does not include costs primarily 
for benefit of the worker, 
such as government-required 
passport fees). employer must 
contractually forbid any foreign 
labor contractor or recruiter (or 
agent thereof) to seek or receive 
payments or other compensation 
from workers.140 
H-2A worker pays 
any government-
mandated 
passport, visa or 
inspection fees to 
the extent that the 
payment of such 
costs and fees by 
the H-2A worker 
is not prohibited 
by statute or other 
laws. 
Workers who complete 
half the season at an 
H-2A program employer 
must be reimbursed 
for the transportation 
and subsistence 
costs associated with 
traveling to the place of 
employment. those who 
complete the full season 
must be paid for their 
transportation costs of 
returning home.141 
employers 
are required 
to provide 
housing free 
of charge.142
employers with a history of noncompliance 
can be suspended, sanctioned and 
disbarred from the program.143 
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Chart of Regulatory Framework (continued)
Visa recruitment and  
Breach fees
Visa cost travel 
expenses
Housing enforcement
H-2B employers and 
agents are prohibited 
from charging 
recruitment fees.144 
Workers who reveal 
to the u.s. consulate 
they paid illegal 
recruitment fees 
risk being denied 
passage to the 
united states.145 
not regulated 
under current 
rules. However, 
visa fees may be 
reimbursed under 
flsA  
in first 
workweek.146 
enjoined rules 
would require 
employer to 
reimburse the 
H-2B worker 
for all visa, visa 
processing, border 
crossing and 
other related fees, 
including those 
mandated by 
the government, 
incurred by the 
H-2B worker, 
during the 
worker’s first week 
of work.147
new regulations, 
currently 
enjoined and 
not in effect, 
would require 
an employer to 
reimburse the 
worker for the 
full amount of 
inbound travel 
costs when 
the worker 
completes 
50% of the 
employment 
contract. 
employers 
would provide 
outbound 
transportation 
costs to workers 
who complete 
the employment 
contract or who 
are dismissed 
for any reason 
before the 
contract ends.148 
none provided under current rules, WHd may 
recommend debarment to etA 
after a final determination; etA 
must debar within two years of 
the violation.149
under the enjoined rules, WHd 
has independent authority to 
debar employers, agents and 
attorneys. the new regulations 
also broaden the offenses that 
may be grounds for debarment; 
debarment period is between 
one and five years.150 oflc can 
impose assisted recruitment on 
employers that violate program 
rules,151 revoke temporary 
labor certifications152 and debar 
employers who willfully violate 
the rules of the H-2B program.153
certifications will not be granted 
to employers who have not 
complied with sanctions imposed 
by final agency actions under the 
H-2B program.154 
J-1 not regulated not regulated not regulated requirements vary among types of J-1 
visas; for example, sponsors must ensure 
trainees and interns have sufficient 
finances to support themselves, including 
housing and living expenses;155 sponsors 
must ensure the host family has adequate 
financial resources to undertake hosting 
obligations and is not receiving needs-
based government subsidies for food or 
housing;156 and sponsors must consider 
the availability of suitable, affordable 
housing and reliable, affordable and 
convenient transportation to and from 
work when making job placements for 
summer work travel visitors.157 
moreover, for employers who provide 
housing and/or transportation to and from 
work for summer work travel visitors, job 
offers must include details of all such 
arrangements, including the cost to 
participants; whether such arrangements 
deduct such costs from participants’ 
wages; and the market value of housing 
and/or transportation in accordance with 
the fair labor standards Act regulations 
set forth at 29 cfr part 531, if they are 
considered part of the compensation 
packages.
the state department sanctions 
and suspends sponsors for 
violations of the regulations.158 
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to freedom from 
economic coercion in u.s. work visa programs. to this 
end, workers shall have the right to:
1. not pay administrative, transportation, lodging or 
recruitment costs;
2. begin work in the united states free of debt associated 
with the u.s. work visa  program; and
3. receive labor contracts that do not economically 
coerce them to remain employed by their sponsoring 
employers.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall be 
fully responsible for all costs related to the recruitment and 
employment of workers under u.s. work visa programs.to 
this end, employers and labor contractors shall:
1. ensure workers do not pay recruitment fees for 
employment in the united states;161
2. pay for transportation and lodging from the worker’s 
home to the worksite in the united states, including 
costs incurred from travel to the place of recruitment, 
the u.s. consulate and the worksite in the united 
states;
3. arrange and pay for all return transportation from the 
u.s. worksite to the worker’s home;
4. not provide loan services to workers; and
5. not sell services, such as insurance or housing, to 
workers at costs above market price.the employer 
is responsible for ensuring no workers pay any costs 
listed above.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall monitor recruitment and 
employment of workers under u.s. work visa programs to 
ensure workers are not subjected to economic coercion. 
to this end, the u.s. government shall:
1. establish programs and processes to monitor the 
compliance of employers and   labor contractors with 
their obligations;
2. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other sanctions  
against noncompliant employers and labor contractors, 
including barring noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors from u.s. work visa programs;
3. require employers to pay for return transportation costs 
from the worksite in the united states to the worker’s 
home; and
4. prohibit employers and labor contractors from 
providing loan services to workers. 
Chart of Regulatory Framework (continued)
Visa recruitment and  
Breach fees
Visa cost travel expenses Housing enforcement
l-1 not regulated not regulated not regulated not 
regulated
not regulated
o-1 not regulated not regulated if employment ends for 
any reason other than 
voluntary resignation, 
employer must pay return 
travel costs to last place 
of residence outside the 
united states.159 
not 
regulated
not regulated
p-3 not regulated not regulated if employment terminates 
for reasons other than 
voluntary resignation, the 
employer and petitioner 
are responsible for the 
p-3’s return travel costs.160
not 
regulated
not regulated
tn not regulated not regulated not regulated not 
regulated
not regulated
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All workers, including internationally recruited 
workers, have the right to be fully informed about the 
terms and conditions of employment before they enter 
into a contract with an employer. However, unjust 
contract practices are pervasive in the international labor 
recruitment process. employers frequently fail to provide 
workers with the terms and conditions of employment in a 
form that is appropriate, verifiable and easy to understand. 
employers and recruiters also present terms that are false 
or misleading, employ coercive tactics to force workers 
to sign unfavorable contracts, and disregard the written 
contracts they provided to the government during the 
labor certification application process. these practices 
interfere with a worker’s ability to give informed consent 
and increase the worker’s likelihood of encountering 
abusive conditions in the workplace.
the u.s. work visa programs facilitate these unjust 
practices through vague and inconsistent regulations 
and a near total lack of enforcement. the majority 
of temporary work visa programs do not require the 
employer to execute a formal, written employment 
contract with a worker who travels to the united states 
for the sole purpose of working for that employer.162 
of the programs that do require written contracts, few 
specifically require that the contract be executed in a 
language the worker understands.163
program requirements vary considerably. several visa 
programs’ regulations do not require employment 
contracts.164 others require the employer to provide the 
government, not the worker, with a written description of 
the terms of employment.165 contractual requirements 
even are inconsistent within the J-1 program’s employment 
categories. teachers must receive and accept a written 
offer of employment with an employer or staffing company, 
and au pairs must receive a copy of the written terms of 
employment signed by the host family.166 However, the 
regulations do not require specialists, camp counselors and 
participants in the summer work travel program to receive 
any contract at all.167 
Right to Receive a Contract with Fair 
Terms and to Give Informed Consent
Workers shall have the right to a legal employment contract that respects 
their rights and the right to provide informed consent before being hired.
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the most robust contractual protections are offered to 
A-3, g-5 and B-1 domestic workers. the regulations 
specify a number of terms that must be included in the 
contract. However, the B-1 program lacks key provisions 
that are required by the A-3 and g-5 programs, such 
as whether the employee has the right to overtime 
compensation.169 the H-2A program also requires written 
contracts.170 
regulatory inconsistency is just one aspect of the 
problem. the government fails to provide contractual 
protections to several categories of international workers 
and also fails to enforce the protections it does provide. 
in the absence of a formal written contract, it is unclear 
whether a worker legally can hold an employer liable 
for the information provided by the employer to the 
government in order to obtain the labor certification. 
federal courts have ruled differently with respect to this 
issue.171 
unjust contract practices are widespread, regardless of 
visa category or employment sector. employers routinely 
fail to provide workers with appropriate contracts in 
a language they understand.172 in addition, there are 
documented cases of recruiters or employers using 
coercive tactics to force workers to sign contracts with 
highly unfavorable terms.173 employers also routinely 
disregard contracts they provide to the government,174 
Worker profile: eb-3 nurse168
When asked about her experience as a nurse recruited from the philippines to 
work in the united states, Archiel Buagas said, “i was so scared of going to work 
that before my shift, i would be crying, i’d be [vomiting] because of anxiety and 
nervousness. i would have diarrhea. . . . [t]he only thing that made me sleep was 
the fact that i’m so tired . . . . i wanted to go home.” 
Archiel was one of a group of 27 filipino nurses who resigned from their jobs in 
several nursing homes in new York state on April 26, 2006, citing unfair working conditions. Among 
the many complaints they lodged against their recruiters were problems with work permits, low pay, 
high patient load and inadequate orientation. According to Archiel, problems began when she was still 
in the philippines. “i wanted to get a copy of the contract, but they didn’t want it [to be] taken out and 
photocopied. so i just left it there. they said over time they would send us papers. there were lots of 
papers that we signed and i just couldn’t keep track of what they were about.”
 
Although the nurses were told by the recruiter in the philippines that if they didn’t feel comfortable, their 
orientations would be extended, this was not the case for Buagas. “i was afraid to go to work, because 
i was afraid that i would do more harm than good to my patients,” she said. “i felt like i needed more 
orientation, but they wouldn’t give it because they needed people on the floor, to be there.” 
Archiel also said she and the other nurses she lived with were asked to work long hours and on their 
days off, often without adequate compensation for the overtime. she worked in a long-term care 
facility and cared for an average of 30 to 60 patients per shift, and sometimes as many as 100, working 
as the medication, treatment and charge nurse all at the same time. “We were also regularly floated to 
units we were not [familiar with],” she said. 
After leaving her job along with the other nurses, Archiel was out of work for three months before finally 
getting a job as a nurse on a city hospital psychiatric unit. she said she was scared on her first day, but 
when she noticed that here the nurses actually took breaks, she went into the bathroom and cried.
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leaving international workers vulnerable to exploitation, 
such as pre-employment debt. 
for example, after incurring substantial debt to pay 
recruitment, visa and travel fees, teachers who were 
recruited for the H-1B program arrived in the united 
states and were forced by their recruiter to sign a contract 
stipulating another round of placement fees, breach fees 
and a clause prohibiting a third party from reviewing the 
contract. the recruiter threatened teachers who tried 
to question the contract that they would be sent home 
immediately, without the opportunity to earn money to pay 
the debt they already had incurred.175 domestic workers 
also have reported their employers explicitly told them 
their employment contracts were signed to satisfy the 
u.s. government requirements only, were not binding 
and would be ignored. employers then paid the workers 
a drastically reduced wage from the wage the employers 
initially had promised the workers.176 
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa Written 
contract 
required?
in Worker’s native 
language?
description of Any contract and terms required 
A-3/g-5 Yes177 Yes178 contract must be signed by the employer and the employee, 
including an agreement by the employer to abide by all federal, 
state and local laws in the united states; a guarantee the 
employee will be compensated at the federal or state minimum 
or prevailing wage, whichever is greater; information on the 
frequency and form of payment, work duties, weekly work 
hours, holidays, sick days and vacation days; a statement by the 
employee that he or she will not accept any other employment 
while working for the employer; a statement by the employer that 
he or she will not withhold the passport, employment contract 
or other personal property of the employee; and a statement 
indicating both parties understand the employee cannot be 
required to remain on the premises after working hours without 
compensation. note: deductions may not be withheld from 
wages for housing, meals, travel, insurance or medical care.179 
B-1 Yes no Applicant for visa must present a contract signed by employer 
and employee at the time of interview and again at the port 
of entry.180 the employer must provide employee with a 
contract that complies with u.s. law.181 employment contract 
requirements are listed in the pamphlet that must be provided to 
domestic worker visa applicants at u.s. consulates.182 
eB-3 no no not applicable
H-1B not specified not specified not applicable
H-1c not specified not specified not applicable
H-2A Yes183 Yes184 Worker must receive a copy of the employment contract by the 
time the worker applies for a visa with the u.s. consulate or 
embassy.185
H-2B no; job order 
required in 
enjoined 
regulations.
no; job order in 
language understood 
by the worker 
required in enjoined 
regulations.186
no employment contract or job order required. enjoined 
regulations would require the worker to receive a copy of the job 
order in a language understood by the worker.187 
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to a legal employment 
contract that respects their rights and the right to provide 
informed consent before being hired. to this end, workers 
shall have the right to:
1. receive a legal and binding employment contract that 
respects their human and labor rights, u.s. law and 
their home country’s laws on labor recruitment. the 
contract shall describe:199
a. the name and contact information of the employer, 
the worker and any foreign labor contractor(s);
b. the type of visa under which the foreign worker is to 
be employed;
c. the address of the usual workplace(s);
d. the start and end date of employment;
e. the type of work to be performed;
f. the pay, method of calculation and period of 
payments;
g. the normal hours of work;
h. daily and weekly rest periods, and any annual leave;
i. the provision of food and accommodation;
j. any costs for which the worker will be responsible;
k. any probationary or trial period;
Chart of Regulatory Framework (continued)
Visa Written 
contract 
required?
in Worker’s native 
language?
description of Any contract and terms required 
J-1 contract 
requirements 
vary among 
J-1 visa 
types.188  
contract requirements 
vary among J-1 visa 
types.189 
The following are some examples of contract requirements: 
Teacher: Written offer for a teaching position, return a written 
acceptance. can be employed directly by staffing company 
instead of a school. 
 
specialist: no contract required by visa program.
Physician: contract required by visa program.  
Au Pair: prior to au pair’s departure from home country, the 
sponsor must provide au pair with a signed agreement with the 
host family that details the terms of the program.  
Summer Work Travel: no contract required by visa program.
l-1 no no the petition must contain evidence that the beneficiary will be 
employed, including a detailed description of the services to be 
performed and evidence the beneficiary has worked at least one 
of the past three years with a qualifying organization.193 
o-1 no194 no i-129 petition must be accompanied by copies of any written 
contracts between the petitioner and the alien beneficiary or, if 
there is no written contract, a summary of the terms of the oral 
agreement under which the alien will be employed.195
p-3 no196 no i-129 petition must be accompanied by copies of any written 
contracts between the petitioner and the alien beneficiary or, if 
there is no written contract, a summary of the terms of the oral 
agreement under which the alien will be employed.197
tn no no evidence of an offer of employment by submission of an 
employment letter. the employment letter must describe in detail 
the duties that are to be performed in order to show the alien will 
be employed in one of the professional occupations.198 
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l. the terms and conditions under which the visa will 
be renewed, with a clear statement of whether the 
employer or the worker will secure renewal, listing 
any costs associated with renewal;
m. terms and conditions relating to the termination of 
employment; and
n. the terms of repatriation.
2. be informed of the terms and conditions of their 
employment in an appropriate, verifiable and easily 
understandable manner before consenting to 
employment in the united states;200
3. receive a full disclosure of the actors involved in their 
recruitment process; and
4. receive two copies of their employment contract, one 
each in english and their native language, to keep for 
their records.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall 
provide workers with an employment contract that 
respects their rights and ensures workers have the 
information and understanding necessary to provide 
informed consent before being hired. to this end, 
employers and labor contractors shall:
1. provide workers with a legal and binding employment 
contract that respects their civil, labor and human 
rights, u.s. law and the laws of their home country 
(see paragraph 1. a.–n. above for a description of the 
contract’s required contents);
2. provide workers with two copies of their contract, one 
each in english and the worker’s native language;
3. not submit workers to employment contracts that 
include unconscionable terms or otherwise require 
workers to forfeit their civil, labor or human rights;
4. not submit workers to employment contracts that 
waive their right to seek civil remedies upon breach of 
contract;
5. provide workers with educational materials describing 
their rights during recruitment and employment in the 
united states; and
6. provide workers with information about actors involved 
in the worker’s recruitment process so workers can 
give informed consent to their employment contract.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall ensure workers recruited 
under u.s. work visa programs receive contracts and 
are able to give informed consent. to this end, the u.s. 
government shall:
1. require that all employee applicants to u.s. work visa 
programs include a copy of their employment contract;
2. establish programs to monitor the compliance of 
employers and labor contractors with the regulations 
related to contracts;
3. establish mechanisms to ensure workers are provided 
with information about the recruitment process, their 
employment contract and their rights and obligations 
under the visa program, so they can give informed 
consent to their employment contract; and
4. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other 
sanctions against noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors, including barring noncompliant employers 
and labor contractors from u.s. work visa programs.
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under the existing system, employers rarely 
are held accountable for the abuses suffered during 
recruitment or employment. most glaringly, employers 
frequently are not held liable for fraudulent, deceptive 
and illegal practices employed in the recruitment supply 
chain by contracted and subcontracted actors. the lack 
of employer accountability for abuses suffered during 
recruitment lends itself to an environment of impunity in 
which employers are able to shift recruitment costs to 
workers. 
the recruitment of international workers begins overseas 
in workers’ home countries, with the vast majority of 
employers relying on private, international recruiters.201 
often, there are multiple levels of recruiters, including 
international labor brokers that employers select, national 
recruitment agencies and community-level agents who 
compile recruitment lists.202 However, workers have no 
way of determining if recruiters are tied to a u.s. employer 
with certified positions. the state department does not 
have an official policy or regulation requiring the collection of 
information about recruiters or end-beneficiary employers.203
laws regulating H-2A and H-2B programs prohibit 
employers from knowingly charging or permitting agents 
to charge workers recruitment fees. regulations require 
employers to attest they will not shift recruiting costs to 
H-2A workers and will “contractually forbid any foreign 
labor contractor or recruiter whom with the employer 
engages…to seek or receive payments from prospective 
employees.”204 However, employers evade these laws by 
claiming they are unaware their workers were charged 
recruitment fees.
Without laws to hold employers accountable for the 
actions of recruiters in the recruitment supply chain and 
staffing agencies, workers are unable to seek redress. 
courts have been reluctant to find an agency relationship 
between the employer and the recruiter.205 However, lower 
courts have held employers responsible for recruitment 
Employer Accountability
Workers shall have the right to be recruited for work in the United States 
under a system that holds the employer accountable for any and all abuses 
suffered during their recruitment or employment.
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fees in some cases. these courts have found that when 
the employer was aware the recruiters charged workers 
a fee, the recruitment fee falls within the flsA’s “primarily 
for the benefit of the employer” exception, meaning 
employers can be held liable.206 staffing agencies 
can further obscure the employment relationship. for 
example, nurses face discrimination in shift assignments 
at hospitals, but the hospital is not the direct employer 
and can escape liability for discrimination.
in addition to employers not being held liable in court 
for the actions of recruiters in the supply chain, the u.s. 
government has admitted its own laws and regulations 
designed to protect internationally recruited workers are 
inadequate. According to a 1990 gAo report, “regulations 
governing J visa programs are too vague and not 
comprehensive enough to ensure that participants and 
their activities are consistent with the intent and purpose 
of the 1961 act,” they “are not adequate to ensure the 
integrity of the program” and “provide little guidance as 
to what constitutes legitimate educational and cultural 
exchanges.”207
the legal protections that do exist are inadequate when 
the u.s. government relies completely on employer 
attestation for monitoring and enforcement or when 
approval is automatic. for example, in the hiring of 
an H-1B worker, the employer first must file a labor 
conditions Application (lcA, form etA 9035) with 
the department of labor through an online system.208 
Approval of the lcA is automated and is granted within 
minutes of submission as long as the information provided 
is complete.209 A 2006 gAo report exposed the problems 
associated with automatic approval, finding the dol 
had certified applications even when the wage rate on 
the application was below prevailing wage for H-1B 
workers.210 
currently, there are some protections for workers, but 
many times they are not enforced or are inadequate. 
for example, u.s. law does not establish mandatory 
employment conditions for migrant domestic workers. 
instead, they are established as employment contract 
requirements in the state department’s foreign Affairs 
manual (fAm), which delineates the agency’s internal 
policy code.211 reliance on the state department’s use 
of the fAm remains problematic because the state 
department maintains it is “not in a position to enforce” 
the contracts once parties are in the united states.212 
thus, although a prospective employer must agree to 
the fAm’s mandatory employment conditions during 
the application process, no governmental agency is 
responsible for enforcing the terms of the agreement 
during the employment relationship itself.213 even if the 
state department becomes aware that an employer 
has breached the terms of the contract, the law does 
not prohibit the state department from issuing future 
visas to the same employer.214 the dol does not review 
applications for domestic worker visas, which it does for 
many other visa categories, nor does the dol monitor 
or investigate employer compliance with the program 
requirements. the only contact the dol has with migrant 
domestic workers is through complaints that occasionally 
are filed with the dol’s Wage and Hour division.215  
In addition to employers not being held liable in 
court for the actions of recruiters in the supply 
chain, the U.S. government has admitted its 
own laws and regulations designed to protect 
internationally recruited workers are inadequate. 
the lack of oversight by the dol with regard to u.s. 
workers is an example of the general problems that 
exist with the way the work visa programs are managed. 
responsibility for oversight of the work visa programs 
is spread throughout numerous government agencies. 
the state department and the department of Homeland 
security’s immigration and customs enforcement (ice) 
and customs and Border protection (cBp) are charged 
with overseeing visas, as well as entry into the united 
states. meanwhile, the dol certifies employers to 
participate in work visa programs and monitors payment 
and working conditions.216 the office of the inspector 
general of the dol found the “etA [employment and 
training Administration] could improve its initial application 
reviews, post-adjudication processes and monitoring 
activities to better protect the interests of u.s. workers 
under the regulations by which the program currently 
operates.”217
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to be recruited for work in 
the united states under a system that holds the employer 
accountable for any and all abuses suffered during their 
recruitment or employment.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall be 
responsible for their labor recruitment supply chain. to this 
end, employers shall:
1. be responsible for understanding and overseeing the 
recruitment practices in their supply chains in the 
united states and abroad; and
2. be liable for all fraudulent, deceptive and illegal 
practices employed in their recruitment supply chain 
by both contracted and subcontracted actors.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall ensure employers are 
held responsible for their recruitment supply chains 
in the united states and abroad. to this end, the u.s. 
government shall:
1. regulate and monitor the recruitment of foreign workers 
to the united states; 
2. investigate potentially unlawful activity committed by 
employers and labor contractors;
3. conduct randomized audits of foreign and domestic 
recruiters and u.s. employers; and
4. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other 
sanctions against noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors, including barring noncompliant employers 
and labor contractors from u.s. work visa programs.
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa is supply chain disclosure required?
A-3/g-5 no
B-1 no
eB-3 no
H-1B no
H-1c no
H-2A no 
H-2B no. regulations that would have required disclosure of foreign recruiters have been enjoined.218
J-1 for some types of exchange visitors, sponsors must ensure compliance of third parties with 
regulations governing the program. Additionally, third parties must have an executed written 
agreement with the sponsor to act on behalf of the sponsor, outlining the obligations and full 
relationship between the sponsor and third party. failure by any third party to comply with the 
regulations or with any additional terms and conditions governing exchange Visitor program 
administration will be imputed to the sponsors engaging such third party.219
l-1 no
o-1 no
p-3 no
tn no
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u.s. work visa programs are plagued with incidents 
of employers keeping internationally recruited workers 
in conditions of slavery, severely restricting the ability of 
these individuals to move freely.220 there are a number 
of ways in which recruiters and employers succeed in 
confining internationally recruited workers, starting from 
the very beginning of the recruitment process. 
Although not addressed with respect to recruiters, the 
state department has directly addressed the problem of 
employers confiscating passports. since february 2000, 
employment contracts for g-5 and A-3 domestic workers 
must include “a statement by the employer that he or she 
will not withhold the passport, employment contract or 
other personal property of the employee” and “a statement 
[…] that the employee cannot be required to remain on 
the employer’s premises after working hours without 
compensation.”221 unfortunately, when employers do not 
follow the law and workers find themselves in abusive 
working conditions with their passports confiscated, 
workers must choose between enduring the abuses or 
attempting to leave the country without their passports. 
in addition to confiscating personal documents, 
employers also routinely circumscribe where the workers 
are permitted to go during nonwork hours or deny the 
workers the right to leave the employer’s premises. to 
enforce these limitations, employers may misrepresent 
u.s. law and culture, exaggerate the dangers of the 
u.s. streets or use other forms of intimidation.222 When 
an employer confiscates passports and other forms of 
identification, threats that a worker may be deported if he 
or she leaves the premises become much more real. 
these issues are exacerbated by the fact the majority 
of temporary worker visas bind a worker to a single 
employer. the worker’s immigration status ultimately is 
dependent on continued employment with the employer 
in whose name the visa has been issued. Where a worker 
holds a visa that is linked to a single employer and that 
employer is abusive, the worker is left with few options. 
the worker either must endure the mistreatment or return 
home immediately. for many, returning is not an option 
because they have arrived in the united states indebted 
from recruitment expenses. the worker effectively is in 
a situation of forced labor, a victim of human trafficking 
unable to leave a situation of abuse. 
Freedom of Movement
Workers shall have the right to move freely and change employers 
while working in the United States.
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A recent case, Chellen v. John Pickle Co., exemplifies 
the issue of restriction of personal mobility. John pickle 
co. confiscated the workers’ passports, visas, tickets 
and i-94s and locked these documents in a safe. A 
company manager told the workers they faced possible 
arrest, investigation or deportation if they left the property 
without the proper documentation. in order to leave John 
pickle co. premises, the workers were required to obtain 
permission, and an armed security guard was placed at 
the main gate. eventually, a number of workers crawled 
under a gate to escape. 
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa change employers?
A-3/g-5 Yes, however, the ability for A-3 and g-5 domestic workers to change employers is extremely restricted 
or not available at all. first, domestic workers must transfer to a new qualified employer prior to the 
expiration of the time period for which she was initially admitted and within generally 30 days after 
leaving her original employer.223 However, if the domestic worker is working for a member of the World 
Bank or imf, the employment contract states that “if the domestic employee’s employment by a staff 
member is terminated for any reason, the domestic employee will not be legally permitted to remain in 
the united states and will be required to leave the country promptly.”224
B-1 Yes, in some instances. depending on the classification of the employer, in some cases the B-1 visa 
holder only may be employed by one employer.225 in other instances, the B-1 visa holder may possibly 
change employment.226
eB-3 Yes, visa is portable so long as the worker’s application for adjustment of status has been filed and 
remained unadjudicated for 180 days or more and so long as the new job is in the same or a similar 
occupational classification as the job for which the petition initially was filed.227  
H-1B Yes, if an H-1B visa holder wishes to change employers and is in the united states, the prospective 
employer must file a petition on form i-129 requesting classification and an extension of the alien’s 
stay in the united states. if the new petition is approved, the extension of stay may be granted for the 
validity of the approved petition.228 
H-1c no, an H-1c nonimmigrant may not change employers.229
H-2A Yes, but very difficult to change employers. if an H-2A visa holder wishes to change employers and is in 
the united states, the prospective employer must file a petition on form i-129 requesting classification 
and an extension of the alien’s stay in the united states. if the new petition is approved, the extension 
of stay may be granted for the validity of the approved petition.230
H-2B Yes, but very difficult to change employers. if an H-2B visa holder wishes to change employers and is in 
the united states, the prospective employer must file a petition on form i-129 requesting classification 
and an extension of the alien’s stay in the united states. if the new petition is approved, the extension 
of stay may be granted for the validity of the approved petition.231
J-1 A J-1 nonimmigrant exchange visitor may accept employment after receiving authorization from  
uscis. 232 the nonimmigrant may change from one designated program to another after approval of 
form ds-2019 and notification of the state department.233
l-1 Yes, provided that another employer was willing to sponsor a visa.234
o-1 Yes, a new employer must submit a new i-129 petition and a request to extend the alien’s stay.235
p-3 Yes, a new employer must file the i-129 petition and the employee is not allowed to work for the new 
employer until the i-129 has been approved.236 
tn Yes, a new employer must file the i-129 and the employee is not allowed to work for the new employer 
until the i-129 has been approved.237
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs have the right to move freely while working  
in the united states. to this end, workers shall have the 
right to:
1. possess their passports and other migration or identity 
documents at all times;
2. move freely during nonwork hours;
3. sever contracts that violate the law, the principles in 
this document or their basic human rights without 
penalty; and
4. leave an abusive employer and seek other 
employment.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall 
not restrict the movement of their workers under 
any circumstance. to this end, employers and labor 
contractors shall not:
1. hold their workers’ passports or other migration or 
identity documents at any time; and
2. restrict in any way the ability of workers to move freely 
during nonwork hours.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall ensure workers under 
u.s. work visa programs are not restricted in their 
movement. to this end, the u.s. government shall:
1. establish laws and programs to protect the workers’ 
right to move freely;
2. assist workers when their employment does not 
meet minimum standards or they are recruited in 
a noncompliant manner, to find suitable substitute 
employment or secure the worker’s return home, at the 
worker’s option;238 and
3. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other sanctions  
against noncompliant employers and labor contractors, 
including barring noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors from u.s. work visa programs.
Worker profile: b-1 domestic Workers
Alejandra ramos and maria onelia maco castro, citizens of peru, were hired by Key Biscayne 
residents Javier Hoyle and patricia perales, an iBm executive and spouse, to work as nannies. 
Alejandra worked for the family for five years before she escaped. maria onelia worked for the family 
for two years. the family initially told Alejandra that she would be working eight hours a day for $7 an 
hour. However, Alejandra worked 19-hour days for the couple and was forced to sleep in a converted 
closet. the couple took the women’s passports and immigration papers. their food was restricted. 
maria onelia was instructed not to speak with people who had encouraged Alejandra to leave their 
home. the couple threatened both women with detention and deportation if they tried to escape and 
threatened to encourage and urge law enforcement and immigration officials to pursue them. 
After a lawsuit was filed, the couple accused Alejandra of sexually abusing their child in retaliation. 
these accusations were found to be baseless. A federal jury in miami found in favor of Alejandra’s and 
maria onelia’s claims against the couple. the jury found the couple violated federal human trafficking 
laws by threatening the women with deportation and withholding their passports.239  
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currently, internationally recruited workers 
have limited ability to freely associate and bargain 
collectively. in order to defend and further their rights, 
workers must be able to join and form labor unions and 
other worker organizations of their choosing. Workers 
must be able to do so without fear or threat of retaliation.
international conventions dictate that workers must 
have the ability to organize and join labor unions with 
the support of the u.s. government and without fear 
of retaliation. the united states joined the united 
nations international labour organization (ilo)240 in 
1934.241 in 1944, the general conference of the ilo 
reaffirmed the fundamental principles upon which the 
ilo is based, including freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.242 in 1998, the ilo declaration on 
fundamental principles and rights at Work established 
that in freely joining the ilo, all members, including the 
united states, endorsed the principles and rights set 
out in the constitution and declaration of philadelphia. 
As a party to the ilo, the united states must protect 
the right of workers to freely associate, and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining.243 in 
addition to being a member of the ilo, the united states 
has ratified the international covenant on civil and 
political rights.244 this covenant states “everyone shall 
have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions.”245
When unions are established, internationally recruited 
workers are better able to fight against abuses in 
recruitment and throughout employment. unions provide 
a mechanism for workers to monitor conditions in the 
workplace and to enforce standards through a collective 
bargaining agreement, which supplements governmental 
enforcement of employment standards and allows 
workers to privately remedy disputes through their union. 
the farm labor organizing committee (floc), which 
was founded in the mid-1960s, is an example of a union 
Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining
Workers shall have the right to form and join unions and to bargain and 
advocate collectively to promote their rights and interests.
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formed to benefit temporary workers.246 under a floc 
agreement, employers are responsible for all recruitment 
costs, even where paid at the local level to recruiters not 
directly affiliated with the employer.247 in 2004, floc 
was able to organize mexican H-2A workers in north 
carolina and execute a contract with growers, the first 
union contract for H-2A workers.248 floc’s victory had 
a profound effect on working conditions. According to 
miguel, an H-2A farmworker in north carolina, “for the 
first few years, we didn’t have any break besides lunch at 
noon. But afterwards, with the help of the union, they gave 
us a break in the morning, the lunch hour, and a break at 
3 p.m.”249 in 2005, floc opened an office in monterrey, 
mexico, to communicate with their members across the 
border. floc started receiving threats soon after. the 
u.s. government should ensure this type of criminal 
activity and intimidation does not continue to occur. 
Workers often are afraid to speak out against abuses 
because they are scared of retaliation against themselves 
or family members. this fear makes it difficult to prove 
recruiter abuses. if workers were union members, they 
would have a support network and would be more willing 
to confront abuses. collective bargaining helps prevent 
abuses by institutionalizing protections and empowering 
workers to set, monitor and enforce many of the 
conditions of their employment.
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa right to form or Join a union covered by 
the nlrA250 
do employers Have the Ability to Hire 
internationally recruited Workers during a strike?
A-3/g-5 no251 no252 not applicable
B-1 no253 no254 not applicable
eB-3 Yes255 Yes256 not specified
H-1B Yes257 Yes258 no259
H-1c Yes260 Yes261 no262
H-2A no.263 farmworkers in some states 
are covered by state laws regulating 
some aspects of organization and 
collective bargaining.264 
no265 no266
H-2B Yes267 Yes268 no269
J-1 for teachers, any such position 
shall be in compliance with any 
applicable collective bargaining 
agreements, where one exists.270
Yes271 for summer work travel, sponsors must 
confirm at the beginning of the season that 
host employers have not experienced layoffs in 
the past 120 days and do not have workers on 
lockout or on strike.272 other types of J-1 visas do 
not specify.
l-1 Yes273 Yes274 no. petition may be denied if there is a labor 
dispute or strike where the beneficiary is to be 
employed.275 However, participation in a strike will 
not result in deportation unless the beneficiary 
violates the inA or overstays her visa.276 
o-1 Yes277 Yes278 no279
p-3 Yes280 Yes281 no282
tn Yes283 Yes284 no285
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to freedom of association 
and to bargain and advocate collectively to promote their 
rights and interests. to this end, workers shall have the 
right to:
1. join or form labor unions or other labor organizations; 
and
2. participate in labor unions or other labor organizations 
without fear or threat of retaliation or penalty.
employeRs and laboR ConTRaCToRs shall not 
restrict the right of their employees to freely associate as 
members of labor unions or other labor organizations.to 
this end, employers and labor contractors shall not:
1. prohibit or interfere with the workers’ right to freedom 
of association;
2. use coercive methods to control the workers’ choice of 
labor union or labor organization;
3. limit the ability of the workers to participate in the 
activities of their labor union or labor organization; or
4. retaliate against or otherwise punish workers for 
choosing to be a member of or participate in a labor 
union or labor organization.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall protect workers who 
wish to exercise their right to freely associate by joining or 
forming a labor union or other labor organization. to this 
end, the u.s. government shall:
1. protect workers who exercise their freedom of 
association; and
2. pursue civil or criminal prosecutions or other 
sanctions against noncompliant employers and labor 
contractors, including barring noncompliant employers 
and labor contractors from u.s. work visa programs.
Worker profile: h-2b seafood Worker
Juana reyes came to the united states on an H-2B visa. she was 53 three years old and came from 
a small fishing community in mexico. life in her village was hard. she had eight children and three 
grandchildren who depended on her to provide for them. she had to work on the fishing boats and in 
the fields in order to survive. At times they did not have enough to eat. 
Juana decided to come to the united states to work for Viet seafood inc. she dreamed of earning 
enough to help her family get ahead. she borrowed approximately $1,000 in order to work for the 
company. she worked 12-hour days for five months, with only one half-hour break for lunch, picking 
crab and peeling crawfish. even working that much, she and other co-workers were called lazy 
mexicans. At times her checks were as low as $35 for a whole week’s work.
she and her co-workers decided to ask for a raise so they at least could earn minimum wage. she 
was scared the boss would cancel her visa and deport her or blacklist her so she could not come 
back to the united states. she and the other workers went to talk to the boss; when he didn’t listen, 
they went on strike. the workers then were fired for their attempted negotiation and strike. 
Juana left for mexico empty-handed—but remained committed to her work in the hopes conditions 
would improve for workers in the future.286  
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internationally recruited workers are limited in 
their ability to seek justice when they suffer abuse at the 
hands of unscrupulous employers and labor recruiters. 
When they denounce abusive or illegal work situations, 
they face reprisals from employers and labor recruiters. 
for example, a carnegie study found that “blacklisting 
of H-2A workers appears to be widespread, is highly 
organized and occurs at all stages of the recruitment and 
employment process. Workers report that the period of 
blacklist now lasts three years, up from one year earlier in 
the decade.”287 Human rights Watch also found evidence 
of a “campaign of intimidation” against workers to 
discourage any exercise of freedom of association by the 
workers.288
even if workers overcome their fear of blacklisting and 
decide to pursue a case, litigating in the transnational 
arena poses many difficulties. one of the main difficulties 
is returning or remaining in the united states to pursue 
action against an abusive employer or recruiter. many 
times, u.s. courts and compensation commissions 
require a worker to be present in order to bring a claim 
and in order to deliver testimony.289 therefore, if a worker 
has left the united states to return to his or her home 
country, he or she must obtain either a tourist visa or 
humanitarian visa in order to re-enter the united states for 
a deposition, trial, hearing or medical examination. 
A tourist visa is difficult to obtain, as it requires proof of 
economic solvency and a $140 usd application fee.290 
it is also difficult for an internationally recruited worker to 
obtain a humanitarian visa because an applicant again 
must pay a filing fee and complete multiple forms.291 After 
an applicant files all the necessary paperwork and pays the 
required fees, the final determination as to whether a visa 
will be issued is at the discretion of the agency.292 therefore, 
even if the dol wants to enforce the laws on behalf of 
an internationally recruited worker, it is difficult to bring a 
worker to the united states for a deposition or to testify 
because visas are not consistently issued. in one well-
documented case, a woman who worked as a maid was 
subpoenaed by prosecutors to testify against her abusive 
employer but was denied a visa to return to testify after 
she left the united states to attend her mother’s funeral in 
Jakarta.293 When the dol complaint process fails to protect 
workers, they are forced to pursue other avenues to justice. 
Access to Justice
Workers shall have the right to access justice 
for abuses suffered under U.S. work visa programs.
.
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Workers in the majority of visa categories are unable to 
access legal services providers that have been funded by 
the u.s. government. even if an internationally recruited 
worker is able to access federally funded legal services, 
many of these organizations are underfunded and 
understaffed. 
When internationally recruited workers are unable to 
access federally funded legal services, they turn to private 
attorneys to take their case. However, many times this is 
not a viable option, because low-wage workers generally 
cannot afford such services. even if a worker can afford an 
attorney, few private attorneys accept low-wage worker 
cases due to language barriers, the low dollar value of 
cases even when they are egregious, the slim chance that 
losing employers will pay attorneys’ fees (the law usually 
does not require that they do so), rural isolation of the 
client and the workers’ inability to remain in the local area 
during litigation.294 
in many ways, international workers are uniquely 
disadvantaged in contrast to u.s. domestic workers 
when seeking justice for abuse and mistreatment. As 
strangers in a foreign land, the myriad obstacles they face 
are particularly daunting. internationally recruited workers 
face possible blacklisting and retaliation from recruiters or 
employers for seeking out legal assistance. they also face 
numerous difficulties during the transnational litigation 
process. further, internationally recruited workers face 
the additional threat of deportation for seeking out legal 
assistance.295 for these reasons, it is particularly important 
that laws pertaining to internationally recruited workers be 
enforced effectively and that unnecessary hindrances to 
their access to justice be eliminated. 
Chart of Regulatory Framework
Visa complaint process eligible for federally 
funded legal services
private right of Action (under the 
program)
A-3/g-5 employees who feel that their rights 
have been violated are directed 
to contact the national trafficking 
resource center hot line.296
no297 no
B-1 employees who think their rights 
have been violated are directed 
to contact the national trafficking 
resource center hot line.298
no299 no
eB-3 not specified no300 no
H-1B local WHd office301 no302 no
H-1c local WHd office303 no304 no
H-2A local WHd office305 Yes306 no307
H-2B local WHd office308 only forestry workers309 majority no310
J-1 local WHd office no311 camp counselors (regulations lack 
any enforcement provisions, remedies 
or a private right of action)312
l-1 not specified no313 no
o-1 contract violations may be 
investigated by the WHd
no314 no
p-3 contract violations may be 
investigated by the WHd.
no315 no
tn not specified no316 not specified
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Recommendations
WoRkeRs shall have the right to access to justice for 
abuses suffered under u.s. work visa programs. to this 
end, workers shall have the right to:
1. denounce abusive or illegal work situations without 
fear of retaliation from employers or labor contractors; 
workers shall have full whistle-blower protections; 
2. bring private civil actions to enforce their rights in u.s. 
courts of competent jurisdiction;
3. otherwise enforce their rights from their home country 
after returning from work in the united states; and
4. return to or remain in the united states to pursue legal 
or other action for abuse or wrongdoing.
The U.s. goVeRnmenT shall protect workers who 
desire to seek justice and facilitate the workers’ ability to 
access justice. to this end, the u.s. government shall:
1. protect workers who denounce or seek to denounce 
abusive or illegal employment conditions or recruitment 
practices without fear of reprisals from employers or 
labor contractors;
2. facilitate workers’ access to justice from abroad after 
they have returned from work in the united states;317
3. facilitate workers’ access to temporary visas to return 
to the united states to pursue justice against an 
abusive employer or labor recruiter;
4. seek restitution for workers when it is available; and
5. allow all workers under u.s. work visa programs to 
access federal legal aid.
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the AFL-CIO is the umbrella federation for u.s. unions, 
with 56 unions representing more than 12 million working 
men and women. it is dedicated to improving the lives 
of working families, bringing fairness and dignity to the 
workplace and securing social equity.
AFT is a union of professionals that champions fairness, 
democracy, economic opportunity and high-quality 
public education, health care and public services for 
students, their families and their communities. the union 
is committed to advancing these principles through 
community engagement, organizing, collective bargaining 
and political activism, and especially through the work 
its members do. Aft represents 1.5 million women 
and men in a wide range of professions, including 
pre-K–12 teachers, paraprofessionals and school-related 
personnel; higher education faculty and professional 
staff; early childhood educators; federal, state and local 
government employees; and nurses and other health care 
professionals.
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. (CDM) is a 
transnational migrant workers’ rights organization with 
offices on both sides of the mexico-u.s. border. cdm 
supports mexico-based migrant workers to defend and 
protect their rights as they move between their home 
communities in mexico and their workplaces in the united 
states. through its programs—outreach, education and 
leadership development; intake, evaluation and referral; 
litigation support and direct representation; and policy 
Advocacy—cdm addresses the geographic and legal 
barriers that typically prevent migrant workers from 
exercising their rights. 
the mission of the Coalition to Abolish Slavery and 
Trafficking (CAST) is to assist persons trafficked for 
the purpose of forced labor and slavery-like practices 
and to work toward ending all instances of such human 
rights violations. cAst’s activities are interconnected 
by a client-centered approach that seeks to empower 
trafficked persons to fully realize their individual potential 
while advancing the human rights of all trafficked persons. 
cAst’s policy advocacy stems from its on-the-ground 
activities working directly with survivors of trafficking through 
its comprehensive legal and social service programs.
the Department for Professional Employees (DPE) 
is a coalition of 21 national unions affiliated with the 
Afl-cio that represent more than 4 million highly 
skilled professional and technical workers. dpe unions 
include professionals in more than 300 separate 
and distinct occupations in many sectors, including 
health care and education; science, engineering and 
technology; journalism, entertainment and the arts; public 
administration; and law enforcement. 
the Economic Policy Institute’s (EPI) mission is to 
inform and empower individuals to seek solutions that 
ensure broadly shared prosperity and opportunity. epi 
researches, analyzes and reports on the economic 
condition of low- and middle-income Americans and 
their families. the organization proposes policy solutions 
aimed at lifting the living standards of the 99%. epi’s 
researchers and economists work on issues relating to 
federal budgets, labor law and labor standards, race and 
ethnicity, education, international trade, immigration, 
retirement security, health insurance, unemployment 
insurance and industrial policy.
the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) 
began in the mid-1960s, when a small group of migrant 
farmworkers in northwest ohio came together for their 
common good. it took several years for floc to build a 
base among farmworkers in the area. since then, floc 
has built a membership of tens of thousands of migrant 
farmworkers by lifting farmworkers’ voices in the decisions 
that affect them and bringing all parties to the table to 
address industrywide problems.
Farmworker Justice is a national, nonprofit advocacy and 
education organization that works to improve working and 
living conditions for migrant and seasonal farmworkers 
and their families. for 30 years, farmworker Justice has 
monitored the H-2A program, litigated violations of the 
Appendices
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program’s statutory requirements and engaged in policy 
advocacy for improvements in the H-2A program. 
Global Workers Justice Alliance (“Global Workers”) 
combats worker exploitation by promoting portable justice 
for transnational migrants through a cross-border network 
of advocates and resources. the group’s core work is 
to train and support a defender network, composed of 
human rights advocates in migrant sending countries, 
to educate workers on their rights before they migrate, 
to work in partnership with advocates in the countries of 
employment on specific cases of labor exploitation and 
to advocate for systemic changes. programs are currently 
in operation in the united states, canada, mexico and 
central America, regularly providing advice and referral for 
cases around the world.
founded in 2007, the National Domestic Workers 
Alliance (NDWA) is the nation’s leading voice for the 
millions of domestic workers in the united states, most 
of whom are women. ndWA is powered by 39 local, 
membership-based affiliate organizations of more than 
10,000 nannies, housekeepers and caregivers for the 
elderly located in 14 states and the district of columbia. 
the National Employment Law Project (NELP) is 
a nonprofit research and advocacy organization with 
more than 40 years of experience advocating for the 
employment and labor rights of low-wage and unemployed 
workers, including workers in nonstandard, contingent 
or subcontracted jobs. nelp seeks to promote access 
to and retention of good jobs for workers, to ensure that 
labor standards are enforced and to bolster the economic 
security of working families, who bear more risks than ever 
in the current economy. We promote policies that protect 
u.s. workers’ access to decent jobs and that defend labor 
and human rights of temporary workers, with a special 
concern about the use of subcontractors to recruit these 
vulnerable immigrant workers. 
the National Guestworker Alliance (NGA) is a 
membership organization representing thousands of 
workers across sectors and industries who enter the 
united states through the u.s. guestworker programs. 
ngA is a project of the new orleans Workers’ center 
for racial Justice, and was formed as the Alliance of 
guestworkers for dignity in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, when thousands of guestworkers were brought 
to the united states to work on the gulf coast and 
were subjected to forced labor. organizing in labor 
camps across the gulf coast, these guestworkers 
formed an organization to help expose the impact of 
guestworker programs on workers, their families and the 
industries in which they work. today, ngA is a rapidly 
expanding national organization of guestworkers across 
many industries, including metal work, construction, 
landscaping, factory work, food processing, janitorial 
services and hospitality. ngA members are committed 
to working in partnership with u.s. workers in the same 
sectors to transform their workplaces from exploitative 
to dignified, change the terms of migration and expand 
the right to organize for all excluded workers—thereby 
reversing a long legacy of retaliation against workers who 
organize to win dignity and freedom.
for 34 years, Safe Horizon has been at the forefront 
of helping victims of crime and abuse in new York city. 
established in 2001, safe Horizon’s Anti-trafficking 
program (Atp) is one of the largest service providers for 
survivors of human trafficking in the united states. the 
Atp’s services are open to women and men, including 
transgender individuals as well as children who have been 
compelled to work against their will.
SEIU is the fastest-growing union in the Americas that 
has come to represent 2.2 million workers in canada, the 
united states and puerto rico, more than 25% of whom 
identify as immigrants—a constant tribute to the union’s 
roots. from the start, seiu has embraced its heritage as 
a union of immigrants and has stood on the front line of 
immigrant justice and workers’ rights. focused on uniting 
workers in health care, public services and property 
services, seiu members are driven by their belief in the 
dignity and worth of workers and the services they provide 
and are dedicated to improving the lives of workers and 
their families and creating a more just and humane society. 
the Solidarity Center is a nonprofit organization that 
works with unions, nongovernmental organizations (ngo)
s and community groups worldwide to advance worker 
rights and achieve equitable and sustainable economic 
development. in nearly 60 countries, the organization 
supports programs that help workers build independent 
trade unions, exercise their rights and improve their 
working and living conditions. the solidarity center uses 
its expertise to combat some of the worst forms of labor 
exploitation, including forced labor, human trafficking and 
migrant worker exploitation.
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the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is a civil rights 
organization promoting racial and social justice through 
litigation, education and advocacy. the immigrant Justice 
project of the splc focuses on the employment and 
civil rights of migrant farmworkers and other low-wage 
immigrants. the project represents workers and other 
immigrants in high-impact cases in nine states in the 
south. 
UNITEHERE! is an international union representing more 
than 300,000 workers in the hospitality, food service, 
gaming and laundry industries in the united states and 
canada. uniteHere!, affiliated with the Afl-cio, has 
been a leading agent in the advocacy for comprehensive 
immigration reform in the united states and for the 
protection of all workers.
Verité aims to make globalization work for poor and 
vulnerable people around the world. the organization 
works to ensure that powerful institutions, and particularly 
the private sector, take responsibility for solving human 
rights problems where goods are made and crops are 
grown. the impact of their work is tangible: more income 
for workers and harvesters; increased opportunities for 
women, minorities and migrants; protection for children 
and those in forced labor; safer working conditions in 
factories, farms, fisheries and mines; and empowerment 
for workers and harvesters.
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Free the Slaves liberates slaves, helps them rebuild their 
lives and changes the economic, legal and social systems 
that allow modern slavery to exist. through innovative 
grassroots community organizing projects, rigorous 
evaluation and groundbreaking research, targeted 
advocacy, and compelling communications and public 
engagement, free the slaves is helping to show the world 
that ending slavery is possible.
Polaris Project is one of the leading organizations in 
the global fight against human trafficking and modern-
day slavery. named after the north star “polaris,” which 
guided slaves to freedom along the underground railroad, 
polaris project is transforming the way individuals and 
communities respond to human trafficking in the united 
states and globally. By successfully pushing for stronger 
federal and state laws, operating the national Human 
trafficking resource center hot line (1-888-373-7888), 
conducting trainings and providing vital services to victims 
of trafficking, polaris project creates long-term solutions 
that move our society closer to a world without slavery.
Vital Voices Global Partnership is the pre-eminent 
nongovernmental organization (ngo) that identifies, 
trains and empowers emerging women leaders and 
social entrepreneurs around the world, enabling them 
to create a better world for us all. We are at the forefront 
of international coalitions to combat human trafficking 
and other forms of violence against women and girls. 
We enable women to become change agents in their 
governments, advocates for social justice and supporters 
of democracy and the rule of law. 
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